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Abstract
We give a necessary and sufficient condition for extremality of a supermodular function based on its min-representation
by means of (vertices of) the corresponding core polytope. The condition leads to solving a certain simple linear equa-
tion system determined by the combinatorial core structure. This result allows us to characterize indecomposability
in the class of generalized permutohedra. We provide an in-depth comparison between our result and the description
of extremality in the supermodular/submodular cone achieved by other researchers.
Keywords: supermodular function, submodular function, core, conditional independence, generalized
permutohedron, indecomposable polytope
1. Introduction
Supermodular functions have been investigated in various branches of discrete mathematics, namely in connection
with cooperative games [33], conditional independence structures [34] and generalized permutohedra [25]. Submod-
ular functions, their mirror images, were studied in matroid theory [23] and combinatorial optimization [11, 32].
Throughout this paper we regard a supermodular function as a real function defined on the power set of a finite set
of variables and satisfying the supermodularity law. As the set of (suitably standardized) supermodular functions
forms a pointed polyhedral cone in a finite-dimensional space, it has a finite number of extreme rays. Characterizing
extremality in the supermodular cone is of vital importance for understanding its structure. This task is solved in this
paper: our main result, Theorem 5, provides a necessary and sufficient condition for extremality of a supermodular
function. The condition has the form of a simple criterion based on solving a system of linear equations.
The research on extreme supermodular functions has been ongoing in a number of different mathematical disci-
plines. Let us mention just a few of them to summarize the motivation for this paper and to recall some previous
results related to the supermodular/submodular cone. Our list is by no means exhaustive.
1. Coalition games. The mathematical model of a cooperative game in a coalitional form is due to von Neumann
and Morgenstern [38]. Convex games were introduced as supermodular functions on the class of all coalitions
by Shapley [33]. Interestingly enough, in the 1972 paper Shapley enumerates all the extreme rays of the cone of
convex games over the four-player set. Nonetheless, he claims that “For larger n, little is known about the set of
all extremals”. A lot of effort was exerted to describe the geometrical structure of the core, which is a non-empty
polytope associated with any (convex) game. The core concept is also among the crucial instruments employed
in this paper. Namely we rely on the characterization of the vertices of the core achieved by Shapley [33] and
Weber [40]. The properties of the core allow one to characterize convex games within the set of all the coalition
games; see [14, 6]. Kuipers et al. [17] provided a facet description of the supermodular cone. Danilov and
Koshevoy [6] employed the Mo¨bius inversion in order to express the core of a (not necessarily supermodular)
coalition game as a signed Minkowski sum of standard simplices.
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2. Conditional independence structures. Conditional independence structures arising in discrete probabilistic
framework belong to a wider class of structural (conditional) independence models, which can be interpreted
as models produced by supermodular functions; see [34, § 5.4.2]. In fact, the lattice of structural independence
models is anti-isomorphic to the face lattice of the cone of supermodular functions. Thus, characterizing the
extreme rays of the cone of standardized supermodular functions can have both the theoretical significance in
characterizing co-atoms of the lattice of structural models and some practical consequences for conditional in-
dependence implication; see [3, § 4.1]. Extreme supermodular functions also establish quite an important class
of inequalities that are used in (integer) linear programming approach to learning Bayesian network structure;
see [36, § 3.1] or [5, § 7]. There were attempts to classify extreme supermodular functions and the operations
with them [35, 15]; see also the open problems from § 9.1.2 of [34].
3. Generalized permutohedra. These polytopes were introduced by Postnikov [25, 26] as the polytopes obtainable
by moving vertices of the usual permutohedron while the directions of edges are preserved. The connection of
generalized permutohedra to supermodular and submodular functions has been indicated by Doker [8]. Morton
[21] earlier discussed the role of generalized permutohedra directly in the study of conditional independence
structures. The class of generalized permutohedra appears to coincide with the class of core polytopes for su-
permodular functions. This allows us to derive as a by-product of our result a necessary and sufficient condition
for a generalized permutohedron to be indecomposable in the sense of Meyer [20]. Although the task to charac-
terize indecomposable generalized permutohedra has not been raised in the literature, we hope it is relevant to
this topic.
4. Combinatorial optimization and matroids. The importance of submodular functions, which can be viewed as
mirror images of supermodular functions, has widely been recognized in combinatorial optimization; see [11],
for example. In fact, the core polytopes correspond to the so-called base polyhedra for submodular functions.
In this context, a non-decreasing submodular function is called a rank function of a polymatroid. As noted by
Schrijver [32, p. 781], already Edmonds [9] raised the problem of determining the extreme rays of the cone of
rank functions of polymatroids. Nguyen [22] gave a criterion to recognize whether a rank function of a matroid
[23] generates an extreme rays of that cone. One of his followers was Kashiwabara [16] who provided more
general sufficient conditions for extremality of certain integer-valued submodular functions in terms of their
combinatorial properties. A few other researchers studied the submodular functions in different frameworks.
These functions have wide applications in computer science as explained by ˇZivny´ et al. in [42, § 1.3], who also
discussed a conjecture on the extreme rays of the cone of Boolean submodular functions, which was raised in
supermodular context by Promislow and Young [27].
5. Imprecise probabilities. Theory of imprecise probabilities deals with generalized models of uncertainty reach-
ing beyond the usual assumption in probability theory, namely the additivity axiom. One of the basic concepts
in this theory is that of a coherent lower probability, which corresponds to a well-known game-theoretical no-
tion of an exact game; see Corollary 3.3.4 in the book [39] by Walley. Similarly, the concepts of a credal set and
of a 2-monotone lower probability are the counterparts of the concepts of a core polytope and of a (normalized)
non-negative supermodular game, respectively. Quaeghebeur and de Cooman [28] raised the question of char-
acterizing the extreme lower probabilities and computed some of them for a small number of variables. Even
a more general task has been addressed in the literature: the characterization of extreme lower previsions given
by De Bock and de Cooman [7] relates them to indecomposable compact convex sets in a finite-dimensional
space.
In this study we proceed without having any particular domain of application in mind, but being aware of the
presence of this topic on the crossroad of many different disciplines mentioned above. We make an ample use of
techniques and results from coalition game theory and finite-dimensional convex geometry. The key technical tool
presented herein is a transformation which associates a certain polytope, called the Weber set, with every game. The
point is that the Weber set of a supermodular game coincides with its core as defined in coalition game theory. Our
main result, Theorem 5, basically asserts that a supermodular game is extreme if and only if the combinatorial structure
of its core fully determines its geometry. The combinatorial concept of a “core structure” we use here has already
appeared in the literature: it was formally defined by Kuipers et al. [17].
The close relation between supermodular functions and generalized permutohedra pervades this paper. This corre-
spondence is realized via a min-representation of a supermodular function based on its core. Our Corollary 11 shows
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that the cores of supermodular games coincide with generalized permutohedra. As a consequence of the extremality
characterization we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for indecomposability of generalized permutohedra
(see Theorem 14).
The article is structured as follows. We fix our notation and terminology in § 2. In particular, we introduce the key
notions of payoff-array transformation and the Weber set there. Moreover, we formulate fundamental Lemma 1 and
explain how to recover the vertices of the core for a supermodular game. Our main result, Theorem 5, is formulated
in § 3. The use of the main theorem is demonstrated by some examples and the interpretation of our criterion of ex-
tremality is discussed. The proof of Theorem 5 is postponed to § 4. A close connection between supermodular games
and generalized permutohedra is revealed in § 5. Sections § 6 and § 7 contain an extensive and detailed discussion
on previous results on extremality criteria for supermodular and submodular functions from the literature. In order to
show that our criterion is indeed new, although perhaps analogous in certain aspects to previous criteria, we analyze
the results by Rosenmu¨ller and Weidner [29, 30] and by Nguyen [22]. We conclude the main part of the paper with
an outlook towards further research in § 8, where we also formulate an open problem to characterize the cone of exact
games. Supermodularity of a set function has many equivalent formulations: they are summarized in Appendix A. In
Appendix B we explain the significance of supermodular functions in the context of conditional independence struc-
tures. In particular, we show that the face lattice of the supermodular cone is anti-isomorphic to the lattice of structural
independence models.
2. Preliminaries
We introduce our notation and recall basic concepts in this section.
2.1. Notation and some basic terminology
Let N be a finite non-empty set of variables ;1 n := |N| ≥ 2 and P(N) := {A : A ⊆ N}. In cooperative game theory,
variables correspond to players, subsets of N are coalitions. Intentionally, no reference total ordering on the set of
variables N is fixed to avoid possible later misinterpretation. Thus, we regard N as an un-ordered set, for example
N = {a, b, c}.
The symbol RN will denote the vector space of real N-tuples, that is, real vectors with components indexed by N;
these are formally mappings from N to the real line R. For every set S ⊆ N, the incidence vector of S is a vector in
RN with the coordinates
χS ( j) =
{
1 if j ∈ S ,
0 if j ∈ N \ S , for any j ∈ N. (1)
Given v ∈ RN and j ∈ N, we will sometimes, when it appears to be convenient, write v j instead of v( j). Thus, a vector
v ∈ RN may alternatively by written as [vi]i∈N .
Occasionally, the symbol i for i ∈ N will be used as a shorthand for the singleton {i}. Therefore, χi ≡ χ{i} ∈ RN
will denote the zero-one identifier of the variable i ∈ N. By a polytope (in RN) we mean the convex hull of finitely
many points in RN . The Minkowski sum of polytopes P, Q ⊆ RN is defined by
P ⊕ Q := { x + y ∈ RN : x ∈ P & y ∈ Q }.
For every ∅ , S ⊆ N, the symbol ∆S will denote the corresponding standard simplex in RN , which is the polytope of
the form ∆S := conv ({χi : i ∈ S }).2
We will also deal with real functions of coalitions, which form the vector space RP(N), formally defined as the
class of mappings from the power set P(N) to R. Given a set S ⊆ N, the corresponding standard basis vector in RP(N)
will be denoted as follows:
δS (A) =
{
1 if A = S ,
0 if A , S , for any A ⊆ N. (2)
1See Appendix B, Remark 27, for the motivation of our terminology.
2The symbol conv (Q) denotes the convex hull of Q ⊆ RN .
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This notation simplifies some formulas for elements in RP(N). For example, for i ∈ N, we introduce a special notation
for the identifier of supersets of {i}:
m↑i :=
∑
S⊆N : i∈S
δS , that is, m↑i(T ) =
{
1 if i ∈ T ,
0 if i < T , for T ⊆ N. (3)
Definition 1 (game, core, supermodular game).
By a game over N, which is our shorthand for a cooperative transferable utility game (see [19, 38], for example), we
will understand a mapping m : P(N) → R satisfying m(∅) = 0. The core of a game m is a polytope in RN , defined by
C(m) := { [vi]i∈N ∈ RN :
∑
i∈N
vi = m(N) & ∀ S ⊆ N
∑
i∈S
vi ≥ m(S ) } . (4)
A game m is balanced if C(m) , ∅. A balanced game m is called exact if
∀ S ⊆ N m(S ) = min
v∈C(m)
∑
i∈S
vi .
A set function m ∈ RP(N) is supermodular if
∀ A, B ⊆ N m(A) + m(B) ≤ m(A ∪ B) + m(A ∩ B) . (5)
A game m over N will be called standardized if m(S ) = 0 for S ⊆ N, |S | ≤ 1.
A well-known fact is that every supermodular game is exact and thus necessarily balanced; see [31, § 5]. A set function
r ∈ RP(N) is submodular if −r is supermodular. A modular set function is a set function which is simultaneously
supermodular and submodular. An easy observation is that the linear space of modular set functions in RP(N) has the
dimension n + 1, with a linear basis consisting of a non-zero constant set function and {m↑i : i ∈ N}. The dimension
of the linear space of modular games over N is n since the only constant modular game is the zero function.
We also introduce a special notation for several sets of games:
♦(N) is the set of all supermodular games over N,
G(N) is the set of all standardized games over N, and
G⋄(N) is the set of all supermodular standardized games over N.
The supermodular cone ♦(N) is not pointed because it contains the linear subspace of all modular games. Therefore,
we introduce a “standardization” procedure which maps ♦(N) linearly onto the pointed cone G⋄(N). Given m ∈ ♦(N)
we put
m⋆(S ) := m(S ) −
∑
i∈S
m({i}) for S ⊆ N, that is, m⋆ = m −
∑
i∈N
m({i}) · m↑i, (6)
and observe m⋆ ∈ G⋄(N). Note that this is just one of possible ways to standardize supermodular functions; see
Remark 5.3 in [34] for further options. Since the only standardized modular game is the zero function, m⋆ ∈ G⋄(N)
given by (6) is unique such that m = m⋆ + g for a modular game g.
2.2. Weber set and a fundamental lemma
A crucial technical tool in the proof of our main result is a certain linear transformation defined here, which is
related to the game-theoretical concept of the Weber set [40].
Let us denote by Υ the set of all enumerations of elements in N, introduced formally as bijections π : {1, . . . , n} →
N from the ordered set {1, . . . , n} onto N. Elements of Υ are in a one-to-one correspondence with permutations on
N: provided a particular distinguished “reference” enumeration υ is chosen and fixed, any π ∈ Υ is a composition of
a uniquely determined permutation on N with υ. Alternatively, elements of Υ can be described by permutations on
{1, . . . , n}: any π ∈ Υ is a composition of the reference enumeration υ with a unique permutation on {1, . . . , n}. We
intentionally regard N as an un-ordered set, unlike some other authors who identify N with {1, . . . , n} and work with
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permutations. Thus, our enumerations have the same expressive power as the permutations but we avoid ambiguity of
composed permutations on {1, . . . , n}.
We introduce a special payoff-array transformation, which assigns to every game m a real Υ × N-array, formally
an element xm ∈ RΥ×N , that is, a function from the Cartesian product Υ × N to the real line R. Specifically, we put
xm(π, i) := m
 ⋃
k≤π−1(i)
{π(k)}
 − m
 ⋃
k<π−1(i)
{π(k)}
 , (7)
for every π ∈ Υ and every i ∈ N. For any π ∈ Υ, the row-vector xm(π, ∗) ∈ RN is nothing but what is named in
game-theoretical literature the marginal vector of m with respect to π, despite different notation; compare (7) with the
definition from [37]. Thus, the entry xm(π, i) can be interpreted as the payoff to the player i ∈ N provided that the
distribution of the overall worth m(N) is based on the ordering of players given by the enumeration π ∈ Υ.3 Therefore,
the Υ × N-array given by (7) is a kind of payoff array in a general sense, as discussed in § 14.5 of [19].
Clearly, the mapping m 7→ xm is an invertible linear transformation: the linearity follows directly from the formula
(7), the invertibility from the fact that, for any π ∈ Υ, the row xm(π, ∗) of the array is in a one-to-one correspondence
with the restriction of m to the maximal chain Cπ of sets, defined by
Cπ : ∅ {π(1)} {π(1), π(2)} . . . {π(1), π(2), . . . , π(n)} ≡ N . (8)
Note that we intentionally include the empty set ∅ into the (maximal) chain Cπ; this becomes convenient later. More
specifically, observe that one has
xm(π, π(1)) = m({π(1)}) − m(∅) = m({π(1)}) ,
xm(π, π(l)) = m({π(1), . . . , π(l)}) − m({π(1), . . . , π(l − 1)}) for 2 ≤ l ≤ n.
Conversely, by inductive consideration one can easily observe
∀ game m ∈ RP(N) ∀ π ∈ Υ S ∈ Cπ ⇒
∑
i∈S
xm(π, i) = m(S ) . (9)
Definition 2 (Weber set).
Every game m over N is assigned the Weber set, defined as the convex hull of the set of rows of the above-mentioned
array xm:
W(m) := conv ({xm(τ, ∗) ∈ RN : τ ∈ Υ}) .
A well-known fact is that the inclusion C(m) ⊆ W(m) holds for any game m; see Theorem 14 in [40]. We base our
proof on the following fact, which is a corollary of Theorem 24 in Appendix A.
Lemma 1. A game m over N is supermodular iff the vertices of its Weber set W(m) give a min-representation of m,
more precisely, iff
∀ S ⊆ N m(S ) = min
τ∈Υ
∑
i∈S
xm(τ, i) . (10)
Supposing this is the case (= m is supermodular) one has W(m) = C(m).
In Appendix A we have also collected a number of other equivalent definitions of supermodularity of a game.
3This interpretation comes from an implicit assumption that A ⊆ B ⊆ N implies m(A) ≤ m(B).
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2.3. Obtaining the vertices of the core for a supermodular game
Another notable fact is that, for a supermodular game m, none of the rows in the payoff array xm given by (7) is a
non-trivial convex combination of others; in fact, they can only be repeated. A basic observation to derive this fact is
that, if m ∈ ♦(N), then
∀ τ ∈ Υ ∀ S ⊆ N
∑
i∈S
xm(τ, i) − m(S ) ≥ 0 , which follows from Lemma 1. (11)
Lemma 2. Given m ∈ ♦(N), τ ∈ Υ and Γ ⊆ Υ \ {τ} such that
xm(τ, ∗) =
∑
π∈Γ
απ · x
m(π, ∗) for some απ > 0 with ∑π∈Γ απ = 1,
then one has
∀ π ∈ Γ xm(π, ∗) = xm(τ, ∗) .
Proof. By (9), one can write for any S ∈ Cτ:
0 =
∑
i∈S
xm(τ, i) − m(S ) =
∑
i∈S
∑
π∈Γ
απ · x
m(π, i) − m(S )
=
∑
π∈Γ
απ ·
∑
i∈S
xm(π, i) − m(S )
=
∑
π∈Γ
απ ·
∑
i∈S
xm(π, i) −
∑
π∈Γ
απ · m(S ) =
∑
π∈Γ
απ ·
∑
i∈S
xm(π, i) − m(S )
︸                     ︷︷                     ︸
≥0
,
where the inner expressions in braces are non-negative by (11). Therefore, since απ > 0 for π ∈ Γ, they all must vanish.
Thus, for any π ∈ Γ, one has
∀ S ∈ Cτ
∑
i∈S
xm(π, i) = m(S ) =
∑
i∈S
xm(τ, i) .
Hence, for any fixed π ∈ Γ, by inductive consideration, xm(π, i) = xm(τ, i) for i ∈ N. 
This gives a simple procedure to get all vertices of the core for a supermodular game, mentioned already in 1972
by Shapley; see Theorems 3 and 5 in [33].
Corollary 3. Given m ∈ ♦(N), one can obtain the set of (all) vertices of C(m) by discarding the repeated occurrences
of rows in the payoff array (7).
Proof. By Lemma 1, W(m) = C(m) and, thus, by Definition 2, the vertex set of C(m) is a subset of the set of rows
in (7). By Lemma 2, after the removal of all repeated occurrences, none of the rows of the pruned array is a convex
combination of others. 
3. The core-based criterion for extremality
The cone G⋄(N) is a pointed polyhedral cone and, therefore, has finitely many extreme rays. Our main result is a
necessary and sufficient condition for non-zero m ∈ G⋄(N) to generate an extreme ray of G⋄(N).
Remark 4. One can introduce extreme supermodular games as follows: a game m ∈ ♦(N) will be called extreme
if m = m⋆ + g, where m⋆ , 0 generates an extreme ray of G⋄(N) and g is a modular game. Therefore, to test the
extremality of m one first applies (6) to m and then tests whether m⋆ generates an extreme ray of G⋄(N).
Another note is that some other authors [29, 30], [28, § 4], [16, § 2] consider the pointed cone of non-negative
supermodular games instead of G⋄(N). Nevertheless, this is only an inessential modification since, by (6), one can
write that cone as the Minkowski sum of G⋄(N) and the cone spanned by {m↑i : i ∈ N}, while such decomposition of
any game in that cone is unique. In particular, the only additional extreme rays of their cone besides the extreme rays
of G⋄(N) are the rays generated by m↑i, i ∈ N. Further minor technical difference is that some of these authors regard
the zero game as extreme, e.g. [16].
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3.1. Formulation of the main result
Our criterion is, in fact, a geometrical condition on the set of vertices of the core of m, denoted below occasionally
by X := ext (C(m)).4 Technically, our criterion is formulated in terms of any real array x ∈ RΓ×N of the form
x = [x(τ, i)]τ∈Γ, i∈N such that X = ext (C(m)) = { [x(τ, i)]i∈N ∈ RN : τ ∈ Γ } , (12)
that is, the set of distinct rows of x coincides with the set of (all) vertices of C(m). The role of the indexing set Γ in
(12) is auxiliary; neither the order of the rows nor the order of the columns matters. Also, repeating the rows has no
influence, as shown below. Nevertheless, the maximally pruned arrays without repeated rows are preferred.
Given a standardized supermodular game m ∈ G⋄(N), the elements of the respective payoff array (7) are non-
negative. This is because every standardized supermodular function is non-decreasing with respect to inclusion. Thus,
it follows from Corollary 3, that the maximally pruned array (12) is unique up to re-ordering of rows and its entries
are non-negative. Moreover, by Lemmas 1 and 2, the assumed array (12) uniquely determines the game m through
(10) with Υ replaced by Γ. More specifically, one has
∀ S ⊆ N m(S ) = min
τ∈Γ
∑
i∈S
x(τ, i) . (13)
Definition 3 (null-set, tightness set class).
We introduce, for any row τ ∈ Γ of the considered array (12)
Nτ := {i ∈ N : x(τ, i) = 0}, the null-set of the row-vector x(τ, ∗) ∈ RN ,
Smτ := {S ⊆ N : m(S ) =
∑
i∈S
x(τ, i)},
the class of the sets at which the row-vector x(τ, ∗) is tight with m .
A notable fact is that the tightness sets Smτ , for τ ∈ Γ, can equivalently be introduced solely in terms of the array
(12). Indeed, because of (13), one has, for any τ ∈ Γ,
Smτ = S
x
τ := {S ⊆ N : ∀ π ∈ Γ
∑
i∈S
x(τ, i) ≤
∑
i∈S
x(π, i) } .
Thus, one can write Sxτ instead of Smτ . When x is fixed and there is no danger of confusion, we omit the upper index
and write just Sτ. Now, we introduce a system of linear constraints for real arrays y ∈ RΓ×N :
(a) ∀ τ ∈ Γ if i ∈ Nτ, then y(τ, i) = 0,
(b) ∀S ⊆ N ∀ τ, π ∈ Γ such that S ∈ Sτ ∩ Sπ ∑i∈S y(τ, i) = ∑i∈S y(π, i).
It is not difficult to observe that the starting array x ∈ RΓ×N from (12) satisfies these linear constraints. Informally, the
characterization is that the structural information given by sets Nτ and Sτ, for all τ ∈ Γ, already determines the array
up to a real multiple.
Theorem 5. Let m ∈ G⋄(N) be a non-zero standardized supermodular game. Consider a real array x ∈ RΓ×N of the
form (12). Then m generates an extreme ray of G⋄(N) iff every real solution y ∈ RΓ×N to (a)-(b) is a multiple of x, i.e.
∃α ∈ R : y(τ, i) = α · x(τ, i) for any τ ∈ Γ and i ∈ N.
The proof of Theorem 5 is given in § 4.
4The symbol ext (P) is used to denote the set of vertices (= extreme points) of a polytope P in RN .
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3.2. Examples
First, we illustrate the use of Theorem 5 by simple examples of supermodular games.
Example 1. Put N = {a, b, c} and define a game m over N by
m(S ) := |S | − 1 for every non-empty S ⊆ N.
Then m ∈ G⋄(N) and the core of m is a translated reflection of the standard simplex:
C(m) = conv ({ [0, 1, 1], [1, 0, 1], [1, 1, 0] }).
The respective array x satisfying (12), without repeated rows, has the form
x =

a b c
π 0 1 1
σ 1 0 1
η 1 1 0
, where Γ = {π, σ, η}.
By Corollary 3, it can alternatively be obtained by discarding the repeating occurrences of rows in the respective
payoff array (7) with six rows. The array x yields the following null-sets and classes of tightness sets:
Nπ = {a} Sπ = { ∅, {a}, {a, b}, {a, c}, N },
Nσ = {b} Sσ = { ∅, {b}, {a, b}, {b, c}, N },
Nη = {c} Sη = { ∅, {c}, {a, c}, {b, c}, N }.
Assume that y ∈ RΓ×N satisfies the conditions (a)-(b) from § 3.1. Then (a) says that the array y has necessarily the
following form:
y =

a b c
π 0 y(π, b) y(π, c)
σ y(σ, a) 0 y(σ, c)
η y(η, a) y(η, b) 0
.
The condition (b) then requires
y(π, b) (a)= y(π, a) + y(π, b) (b)= y(σ, a) + y(σ, b) (a)= y(σ, a) for {a, b} ∈ Sπ ∩ Sσ,
y(π, c) (a)= y(π, a) + y(π, c) (b)= y(η, a) + y(η, c) (a)= y(η, a) for {a, c} ∈ Sπ ∩ Sη,
y(σ, c) (a)= y(σ, b) + y(σ, c) (b)= y(η, b) + y(η, c) (a)= y(η, b) for {b, c} ∈ Sσ ∩ Sη.
Thus, we necessarily have
y =

a b c
π 0 y1 y2
σ y1 0 y3
η y2 y3 0
.
Since N ∈ Sπ∩Sσ∩Sη the condition (b) also gives∑i∈N y(π, i) = ∑i∈N y(σ, i) = ∑i∈N y(η, i), that is, y1+y2 = y1+y3 =
y2 + y3 implying y1 = y2 = y3. We can conclude that the linear system (a)-(b) has all the solutions in the form y = α · x,
where α ∈ R. Therefore, m is extreme in G⋄(N) by Theorem 5. 
The second example shows how non-extremality of a supermodular game can be verified easily.
Example 2. Assume that N = {a, b, c}. Let γ be an enumeration of N such that γ(1) = a, γ(2) = b, and γ(3) = c. Put
t(S ) =
∑
i∈S
γ−1(i)

2
for every S ⊆ N.
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Then t is a supermodular game, namely the so-called convex measure game, discussed already by Shapley [33, § 2.2];
note that we recall a particular extremality criterion for convex measure games in § 7.1,.
It is well-known that t lies in the relative interior of the supermodular cone ♦(N); thus, it is not extreme. Moreover,
t < G⋄(N) since t(S ) , 0 for S ⊆ N with |S | = 1. Let’s apply the standardization formula (6) and put
t⋆(S ) = t(S ) −
∑
i∈S
t({i}) for every S ⊆ N.
In fact, t⋆ = 22 · δN + 4 · δ{a,b} + 6 · δ{a,c} + 12 · δ{b,c} is in the relative interior of G⋄(N). The core of t⋆ is a hexagon
whose vertices are detailed in the rows of the following array:
x =

a b c
µ 0 4 18
ν 4 0 18
π 0 16 6
ρ 6 16 0
σ 10 0 12
η 10 12 0

, where Γ = {µ, ν, π, ρ, σ, η}.
The null-sets and the tightness sets are as follows:
Nµ = {a} Sµ = { ∅, {a}, {a, b}, N },
Nν = {b} Sν = { ∅, {b}, {a, b}, N },
Nπ = {a} Sπ = { ∅, {a}, {a, c}, N },
Nρ = {c} Sρ = { ∅, {c}, {a, c}, N },
Nσ = {b} Sσ = { ∅, {b}, {b, c}, N },
Nη = {c} Sη = { ∅, {c}, {b, c}, N }.
Observe that each tightness set correspond to a maximal chain in P(N). It is easy to verify that the array y ∈ RΓ×N
given by
y =

a b c
µ 0 0 22
ν 0 0 22
π 0 16 6
ρ 6 16 0
σ 10 0 12
η 10 12 0

,
meets the conditions (a)-(b) from § 3.1 and, despite, y is not a real multiple of x. Thus, m is not an extreme game by
Theorem 5. 
The next example is slightly aside the topic because it is an exact game which is not supermodular. It only
illustrates that the condition from Theorem 5 can be considered outside the supermodular framework, although our
result does not apply in this particular case. We conjecture that our condition from Theorem 5 is necessary for an
exact game to generate an extreme ray of the cone of standardized exact games.
Example 3. Assume N = {a, b, c, d} and consider the game m over N given by
m = 4 · δN + 3 · δ{a,b,c} + 2 · δ{a,b,d} + 2 · δ{a,c,d} + 2 · δ{b,c,d} + 2 · δ{a,b} + 2 · δ{a,c} + 2 · δ{b,c}.
The game m is not supermodular as m({a, c}) + m({b, c}) = 4 > 3 = m({a, b, c}) + m({c}). Its core belongs to the plane
xd = 4 − xa − xb − xc and has four facet-defining inequalities:
xa + xb + xc ≤ 4, 2 ≤ xa + xb, 2 ≤ xa + xc, 2 ≤ xb + xc.
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One can easily check that the core C(m) has four vertices [xa, xb, xc, xd], namely [ 1, 1, 1, 1 ], [ 2, 2, 0, 0 ], [ 2, 0, 2, 0 ],
[ 0, 2, 2, 0 ]. This allows one to verify that every inequality in (4) is tight for some v ∈ X = ext (C(m)). In other words,
the game m is exact, which means
m(S ) = min
v∈C(m)
∑
i∈S
vi = min
v∈X
∑
i∈S
vi for any S ⊆ N.
Our computation of the extreme rays of the (polyhedral) cone of exact standardized games over four variables
confirmed that m is an extreme exact game over N. Let us arrange the vertices of C(m) into a Γ × N-array with
Γ = {π, ρ, η, σ}:

a b c d
π 1 1 1 1
ρ 2 2 0 0
η 2 0 2 0
σ 0 2 2 0
. (14)
Assume that y ∈ RΓ×N satisfies the conditions (a)-(b) from § 3.1. The following are the sets Nτ and Sτ for τ ∈ Γ:
Nπ = ∅ Sπ = { ∅, {a, b}, {a, c}, {b, c}, {a, b, c}, N },
Nρ = {c, d} Sρ = { ∅, {c}, {d}, {a, c}, {b, c}, {c, d}, {a, c, d}, {b, c, d}, N },
Nη = {b, d} Sη = { ∅, {b}, {d}, {a, b}, {b, c}, {b, d}, {a, b, d}, {b, c, d}, N },
Nσ = {a, d} Sσ = { ∅, {a}, {d}, {a, b}, {a, c}, {a, d}, {a, b, d}, {a, c, d}, N }.
The condition (a) implies that y has the form
y(π, a) y(π, b) y(π, c) y(π, d)
y(ρ, a) y(ρ, b) 0 0
y(η, a) 0 y(η, c) 0
0 y(σ, b) y(σ, c) 0
 .
Now, the condition (b) implies
{a, b} ∈ Sπ ∩ Sη ∩ Sσ ⇒ y(π, a) + y(π, b) = y(η, a) = y(σ, b) =: U,
{a, c} ∈ Sπ ∩ Sρ ∩ Sσ ⇒ y(π, a) + y(π, c) = y(ρ, a) = y(σ, c) =: V,
{b, c} ∈ Sπ ∩ Sρ ∩ Sη ⇒ y(π, b) + y(π, c) = y(ρ, b) = y(η, c) =: W.
Because N ∈ Sπ ∩ Sρ ∩ Sη ∩ Sσ the condition (b), moreover, gives
y(π, a) + y(π, b) + y(π, c) + y(π, d)
= y(ρ, a) + y(ρ, b)︸             ︷︷             ︸
V+W
= y(η, a) + y(η, c)︸             ︷︷             ︸
U+W
= y(σ, b) + y(σ, c)︸              ︷︷              ︸
U+V
= V + W = U + W = U + V,
implying U = V = W. Then again y(π, a)+y(π, b) = U = V = y(π, a)+y(π, c) implies y(π, b) = y(π, c) and analogously
y(π, a) + y(π, b) = U = W = y(π, b) + y(π, c) implies y(π, a) = y(π, c). Hence, y(π, a) = y(π, b) = y(π, c) = U2 and the
above equalities give
3
2
· U + y(π, d) = y(π, a) + y(π, b) + y(π, c) + y(π, d) (b)= y(σ, b) + y(σ, c) = U + V = 2 · U
implying y(π, d) = U2 . In particular, any solution y to (a)-(b) is the U2 -multiple of the original array (14). The condition
from § 3.1 is, therefore, fulfilled. 
Nonetheless, the condition from Theorem 5 is not sufficient for an exact game to generate an extreme ray of the
cone of standardized exact games as the following example shows.
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Example 4. Put N = {a, b, c, d} and consider the following special game over N:
m† = 4 · δN + 2 · δ{a,b,c} + 2 · δ{a,b,d} + 2 · δ{a,c,d} + 2 · δ{b,c,d} + δ{a,b} + δ{a,c} + δ{a,d} + δ{b,c} + δ{b,d}.
It is easy to see that m† ∈ G⋄(N). Actually, one can verify by Theorem 5 that m† generates an extreme ray of G⋄(N).
In this case, C(m†) has 13 vertices and 13 facets as well. Specifically, the vertices are detailed in the following array:
x† =

a b c d
2 2 0 0
2 1 1 0
2 1 0 1
2 0 1 1
1 2 1 0
1 2 0 1
1 1 2 0
1 1 0 2
1 0 2 1
1 0 1 2
0 2 1 1
0 1 2 1
0 1 1 2

.
It is tedious but straightforward to verify directly that every solution to (a)-(b) in this case is a multiple of x†. Thus, by
Theorem 5, m† is an extreme supermodular game. Nevertheless, m† is not extreme in the cone of standardized exact
games. This follows from the relation m† = m0 + m1 where
m0 = 2 · δN + δ{a,b,c} + δ{a,b,d} + δ{a,c,d} + δ{b,c,d} + δ{a,c} + δ{b,c} + δ{b,d} ,
m1 = 2 · δN + δ{a,b,c} + δ{a,b,d} + δ{a,c,d} + δ{b,c,d} + δ{a,b} + δ{a,d} .
The point is that both m0 and m1 are exact games, which are not supermodular. Their cores have three and four
vertices, respectively, shown in the following arrays:
x0 =

a b c d
1 1 0 0
0 1 1 0
0 0 1 1
, x1 =

a b c d
1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
1 0 0 1
0 1 0 1
.
Actually, our computation of the extreme rays of the cone of exact standardized games confirmed that both m0 and m1
generate extreme rays of that cone. We leave it to the reader as an easy exercise to verify that they both satisfy the
condition from Theorem 5. As concerns their convex combinations mλ := (1 − λ) · m0 + λ · m1, λ ∈ [0, 1], the games
mλ for λ ∈ (0, 1) \ { 12 } have cores with sixteen vertices and none of them satisfies the condition from Theorem 5. 
3.3. Interpretation of Theorem 5
What follows is a minor modification of the definition given by Kuipers et al. [17, § 2]. The below defined
concept has been introduced for general balanced games; however, we believe it is particularly useful and important
in the context of supermodular games.
Definition 4 (core structure).
Let m be a balanced game over N. By the core structure of m we will understand a mapping which assigns to every
vertex v of the core C(m) the class of the respective tightness sets (see Definition 3):
v = [vi]i∈N ∈ X = ext (C(m)) 7−→ Smv =
S ⊆ N : m(S ) =
∑
i∈S
vi
 .
11
Note that “indexing” the classes of tightness sets by vertices of C(m) only plays auxiliary role. One can alterna-
tively and equivalently introduce the core structure as a collection of subsets of the power set P(N), namely as
{ Smv : v ∈ ext (C(m)) } which is basically the definition from [17, § 2].
Such an un-indexed collection of subsets of P(N) is already a fully combinatorial concept, without any obvious geo-
metric meaning. The aim of our definition is to emphasize the expected geometric interpretation of such combinatorial
concept: the subsets of P(N) in the collection should correspond to the vertices of the core.
A relevant observation is that in case of a supermodular game m, the combinatorial core structure is non-empty
finite collection of sub-lattices of the lattice (P(N),⊆). Indeed, Theorem 24(ix) from Appendix A says that every Smv
for v ∈ C(m) is closed under intersection and union and one also has ∅, N ∈ Smv . Moreover, different vertices of C(m)
give rise to incomparable classes of tightness sets. This is because, for each pair of distinct vertices, a facet of C(m)
exists containing just one of the vertices and this facet corresponds to a tightness set. Therefore, for a supermodular
game m, the combinatorial view is always compatible with the “geometric” interpretation from Definition 4.
The standardization procedure (6) basically does not change the core structure. The point is that, in our frame of
standardized supermodular games, the core structure of m already fully determines the system of linear constraints
(a)-(b) from § 3.1. Indeed, assume without loss of generality that Γ = ext (C(m)) in (12) and observe that i ∈ Nτ
iff {i} ∈ Smτ , for i ∈ N and τ ∈ Γ. Theorem 5 and the invertibility of the transformation from § 2.2 then imply that,
provided m generates an extreme ray of G⋄(N), every 0 , m′ ∈ G⋄(N) sharing the core structure with m is necessarily
a positive multiple of m, and, therefore, C(m′) is a dilation of C(m). In other words:
if m is extreme, then the combinatorial core structure of m
uniquely determines the geometric form of the core.
We are convinced that this provides a simple and clear interpretation of our result. Solving the linear equation system
(a)-(b) from § 3.1 then allows one to verify/disprove extremality of m. The indeterminates in our system (a)-(b) are the
pairs (τ, i), where τ corresponds to a vertex of the core and i to a variable. It looks like that our system substantially
differs from former approaches just in this aspect.
Remark 6. Kuipers et al. in their 2010 paper [17] introduced a further relevant concept. Specifically, they name a
game g a limit game for a balanced game m if, for every extreme point v ∈ ext (C(m)), an extreme point w ∈ ext (C(g))
exists such that Smv ⊆ S
g
w, that is, if g has a coarser core structure than m. Also, they consider balanced games to be
equivalent if they have the same core structure. To illustrate these concepts they show that the class of limit games for
a strictly supermodular game m, that is, m satisfying
m(A ∪ B) + m(A ∩ B) > m(A) + m(B) whenever A, B ⊆ N with A \ B , ∅ , B \ A,
is just the class of supermodular games. This implies that the equivalent games to such a game m are just the other
strictly supermodular games. Note that the set of all strictly supermodular games coincides with the relative interior
of ♦(N). The main result of [17] characterizes the set of limit games g for a balanced game m in terms of linear
inequality constraints, which are, also uniquely determined by the core structure of m. In contrast to our system
of linear constraints (a)-(b) from § 3.1, these are constraints on the game values g(S ), S ⊆ N, and obtaining those
inequalities from the core structure is not straightforward.
4. Proof of the main result
We first prove Theorem 5 in a canonical special case when x ∈ RΓ×N is the payoff array xm given by the formula (7).
The following observation on the respective tightness sets (see Definition 3) follows from (9) and is used repeatedly
in the proof below:
∀ τ ∈ Υ Cτ ⊆ S
m
τ . (15)
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Lemma 7. Assuming 0 , m ∈ G⋄(N), let x = xm be the array given by (7).5 Then m is extreme iff every real solution
y ∈ RΥ×N to (a)-(b) is a multiple of xm, that is,
∃α ∈ R : y(τ, i) = α · xm(τ, i) for any τ ∈ Υ and i ∈ N.
Proof. We show that the negation of the condition above, namely, the condition
∃ a solution y ∈ RΥ×N of (a)-(b) : y < Lin (xm) , (16)
where Lin (∗) denotes the linear hull (in the respective space), is equivalent to the condition
∃ non-zero r, s ∈ G⋄(N) : Lin (r) , Lin (s) and m = 12 · r +
1
2
· s , (17)
which is one of possible formulations of non-extremality of m in the cone G⋄(N).
To show (17)⇒(16) realize that the mapping m 7→ xm is an invertible linear transformation, which implies that xr
and xs are both non-zero, Lin (xr) , Lin (xs) and
xm =
1
2
· xr +
1
2
· xs . (18)
We show that both xr and xs solve (a)-(b); since one of them is outside Lin (xm), it gives (16). One can derive that
conclusion from the fact that xm satisfies (a)-(b) using (18). To show (a) realize that, for τ ∈ Υ and i ∈ Nτ one has
0 = xm(τ, i) = 1
2
· xr(τ, i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+
1
2
· xs(τ, i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
,
where the both terms on the right-hand side are non-negative. Indeed, realize we know r, s ∈ G⋄(N), and, therefore,
their payoff-arrays are non-negative. Therefore, they must vanish: xr(τ, i) = 0 = xs(τ, i).
As concerns (b), for S ⊆ N and τ, π ∈ Υ such that S ∈ Sτ ∩ Sπ we first particularly write for τ: because
S ∈ Sτ ≡ Smτ one has by (18)
0 =
∑
i∈S
xm(τ, i) − m(S ) = 1
2
·
∑
i∈S
xr(τ, i) − r(S )
︸                  ︷︷                  ︸
≥0
+
1
2
·
∑
i∈S
xs(τ, i) − s(S )
︸                   ︷︷                   ︸
≥0
,
where the terms on the right-hand side must be non-negative by (11); realize r, s ∈ G⋄(N). This gives both∑i∈S xr(τ, i) =
r(S ) and ∑i∈S xs(τ, i) = s(S ). The second step is to repeat the same consideration for π in place of τ and derive
both ∑i∈S xr(π, i) = r(S ) and ∑i∈S xs(π, i) = s(S ). Hence, ∑i∈S xr(τ, i) = r(S ) = ∑i∈S xr(π, i) and analogously∑
i∈S x
s(τ, i) = s(S ) = ∑i∈S xs(π, i). Thus, xr and xs both satisfy (b), which completes the proof of (17)⇒(16).
To show (16)⇒(17), choose and fix y ∈ RΥ×N mentioned in (16). The first step is to show that a game t over N
exists such that y = xt, that is, y is the range of our payoff-array transformation. Recall from § 2.2 that, provided
y = xt, for every π ∈ Υ, the respective row y(π, ∗) of the array y ∈ RΥ×N determines (and is determined by) the values
of t on the (maximal) chain Cπ by the relation (9), that is,
t(S ) =
∑
i∈S
y(π, i) for every S ∈ Cπ.
Therefore, the definition of a desired game t with y = xt is correct if and only if the following consistency condition is
satisfied:
∀ τ, π ∈ Υ ∀ S ∈ Cτ ∩ Cπ
∑
i∈S
y(τ, i) =
∑
i∈S
y(π, i) . (19)
5The specialty of this array is that the row-index set Γ is the set Υ of all enumerations for N.
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To verify (19) realize that, for τ, π ∈ Υ and S ∈ Cτ ∩ Cπ, (15) gives Cτ ⊆ Smτ = Sτ and Cπ ⊆ Smπ = Sπ and then the
condition (b) for y implies ∑i∈S y(τ, i) = ∑i∈S y(π, i), which was desired.
The second step is to verify that t is standardized. Since m is standardized, for any π ∈ Υ, one has xm(π, π(1)) =
m({π(1)}) = 0, implying π(1) ∈ Nπ. Then the condition (a) for y implies y(π, π(1)) = 0, that is, t({π(1)}) = 0. In
particular, t(S ) = 0 for any S ⊆ N with |S | ≤ 1 and we know t ∈ G(N).
The third step is to consider the line L in G(N) passing through t and m, namely the collection of vectors
qε := (1 − ε) · m + ε · t where ε ∈ R,
and show that, for sufficiently small ε, one has qε ∈ G⋄(N). Since the payoff-array transformation is linear, for any
ε ∈ R, it transforms qε to
zε := (1 − ε) · xm + ε · y ,
that is, L is transformed to the line in RΥ×N passing through y and xm. The condition (9) applied to elements of L gives
∀ ε ∈ R ∀ π ∈ Υ S ∈ Cπ ⇒
∑
i∈S
zε(π, i) = qε(S ) .
Further considerations are done with a fixed set S ⊆ N. One can certainly find and fix π ∈ Υ with S ∈ Cπ. By (15),
one also has S ∈ Smπ = Sπ. Since the conditions (a)-(b) define a linear space in RΥ×N and both xm and y satisfy them,
for any ε ∈ R, the vector zε must satisfy them as well. Thus, the condition (b), applied to zε, allows one to derive
∀ ε ∈ R ∀ τ ∈ Υ with S ∈ Sτ one has
∑
i∈S
zε(τ, i) =
∑
i∈S
zε(π, i) = qε(S ) .
Now, consider τ ∈ Υ with S < Sτ = Smτ instead. By (11) combined with the definition of Smτ and then by (9) applied
to m we get
0 <
∑
i∈S
xm(τ, i) − m(S ) =
∑
i∈S
xm(τ, i) −
∑
i∈S
xm(π, i) .
This allows one to write, for every ε ∈ R, by (9) applied to qε,∑
i∈S
zε(τ, i) − qε(S ) =
∑
i∈S
zε(τ, i) −
∑
i∈S
zε(π, i)
= (1 − ε) ·
∑
i∈S
xm(τ, i) −
∑
i∈S
xm(π, i)
 + ε ·
∑
i∈S
y(τ, i) −
∑
i∈S
y(π, i)
 ,
and observe that the limit of this expression with ε tending to zero is positive. Therefore, for sufficiently small |ε|, one
has the following:
∀ τ ∈ Υ with S < Sτ one has
∑
i∈S
zε(τ, i) > qε(S ) .
In particular, for sufficiently small |ε|, one has
qε(S ) = min
τ∈Υ
∑
i∈S
zε(τ, i) ,
and, since this consideration can be done for any S ⊆ N, one can observe that the condition (10) holds for qε for
sufficiently small |ε|, that is, qε ∈ G⋄(N) by Lemma 1.
Thus, there exists 0 < ε such that both r := (1 − ε) · m + ε · t and s := (1 + ε) · m − ε · t belong to G⋄(N).
Clearly, m = 12 · r +
1
2 · s. The line L does not contain the zero vector 0, as otherwise, by linearity of the payoff-array
transformation, one derives a contradictory conclusion y ∈ Lin (xm). Hence, r and s are non-zero. The fact 0 < L also
gives the observation Lin (r) , Lin (s). Altogether, the condition (17) has been verified. 
We show now that the removal of repeated row-occurrences in the array from Theorem 5 has no influence. Observe
that any array x ∈ RΓ×N of the form (12) satisfies
∀ τ ∈ Γ ∃σ ∈ Υ Cσ ⊆ Sτ , (20)
which follows from (15) using Corollary 3.
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Lemma 8. Under the assumptions of Theorem 5, consider Γ′ ⊆ Γ such that
(i) ∀ π, τ ∈ Γ′ x(π, ∗) , x(τ, ∗),
(ii) ∀ τ ∈ Γ \ Γ′ ∃ π ∈ Γ′ x(π, ∗) = x(τ, ∗).
Then, one can replace Γ by Γ′ in the condition from Theorem 5.
Proof. Assuming the condition for Γ×N-array holds we observe easily that its restriction to Γ′ ×N satisfies it relative
to Γ′ × N. Indeed, if y ∈ RΓ′×N satisfies (a)-(b), its extension based on (ii) satisfies (a)-(b) with respect to Γ × N: for
τ ∈ Γ \Γ′, we choose (and fix) π ∈ Γ′ with x(π, ∗) = x(τ, ∗) and put y(τ, ∗) := y(π, ∗). The extension must be a multiple
of (extended) x and the same holds for their restrictions.
Conversely, assuming the condition from Theorem 5 holds for Γ′ × N-array, we verify it for Γ × N. If y ∈ RΓ×N
satisfies (a)-(b), its restriction to Γ′×N satisfies them with respect to Γ′×N and must be a α-multiple of the respective
restriction of x, for some α ∈ R. By (ii), for any τ ∈ Γ \ Γ′, we find (and fix) π ∈ Γ′ such that x(π, ∗) = x(τ, ∗), which
implies Sτ = Sπ. By (20), choose σ ∈ Υ with Cσ ⊆ Sτ and, by the condition (b) for y, get
∀ S ∈ Cσ ⊆ Sτ = Sπ
∑
i∈S
y(τ, i) =
∑
i∈S
y(π, i) ,
which allow one to derive, by inductive consideration, that y(τ, ∗) = y(π, ∗). Therefore, y must coincide with α · x. 
In conclusion, Theorem 5 now follows from Lemma 7, Corollary 3 and Lemma 8.
5. Relation to generalized permutohedra
Relatively recently, a highly relevant concept of a generalized permutohedron has been introduced and studied by
Postnikov and his co-authors [25, 26]. The following is a minor modification of [26, Definition 3.1].
Definition 5 (generalized permutohedron).
Let {vπ}π∈Υ be a collection of vectors in RN parameterized by enumerations (of N) such that for every π ∈ Υ and for
every adjacent transposition σ : ℓ ↔ ℓ + 1, where 1 ≤ ℓ < n, a non-negative constant kπ,ℓ ≥ 0 exists such that
vπ − vπσ = kπ,ℓ · (χπ(ℓ) − χπ(ℓ+1)) , (21)
where πσ denotes the composition of π with σ and χi ∈ RN is the zero-one identifier of a variable i ∈ N (see § 2.1).
The respective generalized permutohedron is then the convex hull of that collection of vectors:
G({vπ}π∈Υ) := conv ({vπ ∈ RN : π ∈ Υ}) .
Example 5. An example of a generalized permutohedron is the “classic” permutohedron determined, for example, by
a strictly decreasing sequence of reals r1 > r2 > . . . > rn as the convex hull Q0 := P(r1, r2, . . . , rn) of the collection of
vectors
vπ := [rπ−1(i)]i∈N for π ∈ Υ .
Indeed, if σ : ℓ ↔ ℓ + 1, 1 ≤ ℓ < n is an adjacent transposition and π : {1, . . . , n} → N an enumeration with π(ℓ) = a,
π(ℓ + 1) = b then π−1(i) = (πσ)−1(i) for i ∈ N \ {a, b} and
vπ − vπσ = rπ−1(a) · χa + rπ−1(b) · χb − r(πσ)−1 (a) · χa − r(πσ)−1 (b) · χb
= rℓ · χa + rℓ+1 · χb − rℓ+1 · χa − rℓ · χb = (rℓ − rℓ+1) · (χa − χb)
= (rℓ − rℓ+1)︸      ︷︷      ︸
>0
·(χπ(ℓ) − χπ(ℓ+1)) ,
which means the constant kπ,ℓ ≡ rℓ − rℓ+1 in (21) is strictly positive in this case.
Side-note: We believe there is a misprint in [26, § 3.1] in the motivational text preceding their Definition 3.1. Specifi-
cally, we think the authors intended a1 > a2 > . . . > an instead of a1 < a2 < . . . < an in [26, p. 215 below]. Indeed, that
“decreasing” convention, which was implicitly used in the original manuscript [25], leads to (21) while the opposite
“increasing” convention leads to kπ,ℓ ≤ 0 in (21), respectively to (22) below. 
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The concepts of a generalized permutohedron and that of a core of a supermodular game basically coincide. The
relation is evident through the concept of the Weber set (see Definition 2).
Lemma 9. A polytope P ⊆ RN is a generalized permutohedron iff there exists a supermodular game m over N such
that P = W(m).
Proof. The first observation is that a generalized permutohedron can be equivalently introduced as the convex hull
conv ({xτ ∈ RN : τ ∈ Υ}) of a set of vectors {xτ}τ∈Υ in RN such that
∀ τ ∈ Υ ∀ ς : l ↔ l + 1, 1 ≤ l < n ∃Kτ,l ≥ 0 xτ − xτς = Kτ,l · (χτ(l+1) − χτ(l)) , (22)
which is, technically, the formula (21) in which the right-hand side is multiplied by (−1). This paradox has an easy
explanation: the vectors vπ, π ∈ Υ can be re-indexed by inverse enumerations instead, one can put, for any τ ∈ Υ,
xτ := vπ where π = τρ and ρ is the “inverting” permutation on {1, 2, . . . , n}
given by ρ(k) := n + 1 − k for any k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Of course, the convex hull is the same after the re-indexing, but (21) turns into (22).
The second observation is that the condition (22) implies the following consistency condition, analogous to the
condition (19), namely
∀ τ, π ∈ Υ ∀ S ∈ Cτ ∩ Cπ
∑
i∈S
xτ(i) =
∑
i∈S
xπ(i) . (23)
Indeed, whenever S ⊆ N is fixed and τ, π ∈ Υ are such that S ∈ Cτ ∩ Cπ one has
⋃
k≤s{τ(k)} = S =
⋃
k≤s{π(k)} where
s = |S |. Hence, there exists a sequence of adjacent transpositions ς : l ↔ l + 1, 1 ≤ l < n satisfying either l + 1 ≤ s
or s < l and transforming τ successively into π. For every such transposition ς and any υ ∈ Υ in the transformation
sequence from τ to π one has
∑
i∈S xυ(i) =
∑
i∈S xυς(i) by (22), which allows one to derive (23).
Thus, the relation (23) makes it possible to define correctly a game m over N by
m(S ) :=
∑
i∈S
xτ(i) whenever S ∈ Cτ for some τ ∈ Υ. (24)
The third observation is that the condition (22) even implies that m given by (24) is supermodular. It is enough to
show (see Appendix B), for any Z ⊆ N and distinct a, b ∈ N \ Z that
∆m(a, b|Z) := m({a, b} ∪ Z) + m(Z) − m({a} ∪ Z) − m({b} ∪ Z) ≥ 0 .
Indeed, given such a set Z with s = |Z| find τ ∈ Υ such that⋃k≤s{τ(k)} = Z, τ(s+1) = a and τ(s+2) = b. Then consider
an adjacent transposition ς : s+ 1 ↔ s+ 2 and observe that Z, {a} ∪ Z, {a, b} ∪ Z ∈ Cτ while Z, {b} ∪ Z, {a, b} ∪ Z ∈ Cτς.
The condition (22) gives xτ − xτς = Kτ,s+1 · (χτ(s+2) − χτ(s+1)) = Kτ,s+1 · (χb − χa). In other words,
xτς(a) = xτ(a) + Kτ,s+1, xτς(b) = xτ(b) − Kτ,s+1 and xτς(i) = xτ(i) for i ∈ N \ {a, b}.
Hence, by (24), m(Z) = ∑i∈Z xτ(i), m({a} ∪ Z) = ∑i∈Z xτ(i)+ xτ(a) = m(Z)+ xτ(a), m({b} ∪ Z) = ∑i∈Z xτς(i)+ xτς(b) =
m(Z) + xτς(b) = m(Z) + xτ(b) − Kτ,s+1 and, finally, m({a, b} ∪ Z) = ∑i∈Z xτ(i) + xτ(a) + xτ(b) = m(Z) + xτ(a) + xτ(b).
This gives
m({a, b} ∪ Z) + m(Z) − m({a} ∪ Z) − m({b} ∪ Z) = Kτ,s+1 ≥ 0 ,
which was desired. The comparison of (24) and (9) gives xm(τ, i) = xτ(i) for i ∈ N, τ ∈ Υ, which concludes the proof
that every generalized permutohedron is the Weber set for some supermodular game.
The converse implication saying that the Weber set W(m) for a supermodular game m over N is a generalized
permutohedron is easier. It is enough to show that the row-vectors of the Υ×N-array x := xm given by (7) satisfy (22).
This can be verified by an inverse consideration: one can show that, for given τ ∈ Υ and ς : l ↔ l + 1, 1 ≤ l < n the
condition (22) holds with Kτ,l = m({a, b} ∪ Z) + m(Z) − m({a} ∪ Z) − m({b} ∪ Z) where Z = ⋃k<l{τ(k)}, a = τ(l) and
b = τ(l + 1). This concludes the proof. 
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Remark 10. Note that it follows from the above arguments that a polytope P ⊆ RN is a generalized permutohedron
iff its (−1)-multiple is a generalized permutohedron. Indeed, if P = G({vπ}π∈Υ) then −P = G({−vπ}π∈Υ) and the vectors
vπ, π ∈ Υ satisfy (21) iff the vectors xπ := −vπ, π ∈ Υ satisfy (22), with the same constant. The first observation in the
proof of Lemma 9 then implies what is claimed.
In particular, another equivalent formulation of Lemma 9 is that a polytope P ⊆ RN is a generalized permutohedron
iff there exists a submodular game m over N such that P = W(m). This is because our payoff-array transformation is
linear: therefore, W(−m) = (−1) · W(m) and we know m is supermodular iff −m is submodular.
The consequence of Lemma 9 and Lemma 1 (the second statement) is as follows.
Corollary 11. A polytope P ⊆ RN is a generalized permutohedron iff it is the core of a supermodular game m over
N, that is, iff ∃m ∈ ♦(N) such that
P = C(m) ≡
 [vi]i∈N ∈ RN :
∑
i∈N
vi = m(N) & ∀ S ⊆ N
∑
i∈S
vi ≥ m(S )
 .
Thus, the class of generalized permutohedra coincides with the class of cores of “convex” (= supermodular)
games. The dual formulation of Corollary 11 is that P is a generalized permutohedron iff there exists a submodular
game r ∈ RP(N), r(∅) = 0 with
P =
 [vi]i∈N ∈ RN :
∑
i∈N
vi = r(N) & ∀ S ⊆ N
∑
i∈S
vi ≤ r(S )
 .
Indeed, the relation between the lower bounds from Corollary 11 and the upper bounds in the above formula is as
follows: r(S ) + m(N \ S ) = m(N) = r(N) for any S ⊆ N. Note that this is one of possible correspondences between
supermodular and submodular games, see the discussion in § 7.2, the relations (32) and (33) on page 27.
Remark 12. Note that the fact that every generalized permutohedron has the form (4) has also been mentioned in
recent literature on generalized permutohedra. Nevertheless, we feel that the formulation of this fact in [1, § 2] and
[8, § 2.2] is somehow ambiguous and needs clarification or a warning of possible misinterpretation. Since the formal
definition of the concept of a generalized permutohedron is omitted therein,6 the reader of [1, 8], not being aware of
the precise definition, easily gets the impression that generalized permutohedra are “just” defined by (4), where the
lower bounds m(S ), S ⊆ N are required to be tight. Then subsequent Theorem 2.1 in [1], respectively Theorem 2.2.1
in [8], may be misinterpreted as the claim that the lower bounds in (4) are tight iff they define a supermodular game.
This is not true as Example 3 showed; the polytope there is not a generalized permutohedron, despite it is the core of
an exact game.
To explain the relation of our result from § 3.1 to the theory of generalized permutohedra let us mention their
equivalent characterization in terms of Minkowski sum. It is based on the following concept recalled in [21, § 1.1].
Definition 6. We say that a polytope P ⊆ RN is a Minkowski summand of a polytope Q ⊆ RN if there exists λ > 0
and a polytope R ⊆ RN such that λ · Q = P ⊕ R.
The following characterization of generalized permutohedra has been given in Proposition 3.2 of [26]; see also
related Theorem 2.4.3 in [21].
Lemma 13. A polytope P ⊆ RN is a generalized permutohedron iff it is a Minkowski summand of the permutohedron.
Proof. We can easily show that every generalized permutohedron is a summand of the permutohedron. To this end
we define a special standardized game m by
m(S ) = 1
2
· |S | · (|S | − 1) for any S ⊆ N.
6An informal vague sentence with a reference to [26] is only written there instead.
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Observe that its Weber set Q0 := W(m) coincides with the permutohedron P(r1, . . . , , rn), where rk := n − k for
k = 1, . . . , n (see Example 5). Note that, for any Z ⊆ N and distinct a, b ∈ N \ Z, one has
∆m(a, b|Z) = m({a, b} ∪ Z) + m(Z) − m({a} ∪ Z) − m({b} ∪ Z) = 1 ,
which allows one to observe (see Appendix B) that m ∈ G⋄(N) and, for any m˜ ∈ G⋄(N), there exists λ > 0 such that
λ · m − m˜ ∈ G⋄(N).
Thus, given a generalized permutohedron P ⊆ RN , by Lemma 9 we find a supermodular game m such that
P = W(m) and define a standardized version m⋆ of m by (6). Find λ > 0 with λ · m − m⋆ ∈ G⋄(N) and observe
λ · m = m + r where r := (λ · m − m⋆) −∑i∈N m({i}) · m↑i is a supermodular game.
Hence, λ · Q0 = W(λ · m) = W(m) ⊕ W(r) = P ⊕ W(r).
For the inverse implication we refer to Proposition 3.2 and Theorem 15.3 in [26]. The arguments there go through
another equivalent definition of a generalized permutohedron saying that its normal fan coarsens the normal fan of the
permutohedron; for these concepts see § 1.1 of [21]. 
Thus, one can introduce a natural pre-order on the class of generalized permutohedra, namely P  Q iff P is
a Minkowski summand of (a generalized permutohedron) Q and the respective equivalence relation P ≃ Q defined
by P  Q  P. This leads to the following concept motivated by the general notion of join-irreducibility from
lattice theory; see [2, § III.3]. Moreover, in our context, this concept also appears to correspond to the notion of an
indecomposable polytope; see Remark 15. This fact motivated our terminology.
Definition 7. A generalized permutohedron P ⊆ RN has a non-trivial decomposition if
λ · P = P1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ Pk for some λ > 0 and generalized permutohedra P1, . . . , Pk,
none of which is equivalent to P. If this is not the case we say that P is indecomposable.
One anticipates that any generalized permutohedron can be decomposed into indecomposable ones. Therefore,
a natural question is whether one can geometrically characterize the indecomposable generalized permutohedra. A
trivial observation is that P ⊆ RN is indecomposable iff any translation P⊕{v} for v ∈ RN is indecomposable. Therefore,
we are only interested in standardized polytopes, that is, polytopes P ⊆ [0,∞)N such that, for any i ∈ N, an element
v ∈ P exists with vi = 0. Our result from § 3.1 can be interpreted as the solution to the problem of characterization of
indecomposable generalized permutohedra.
Theorem 14. A standardized generalized permutohedron P ⊆ RN is indecomposable (in sense of Definition 7) iff
the set X of its vertices satisfies the condition of Theorem 5, that is, given x ∈ RΓ×N satisfying (12), every solution
y ∈ RΓ×N to (a)-(b) is a multiple of x. If this is the case, then the only standardized generalized permutohedra
equivalent to P are its multiples λ · P where λ > 0.
For any non-empty finite set of variables N, there exists a finite number of indecomposable types of generalized
permutohedra. Every generalized permutohedron can be written as the Minkowski sum of indecomposable ones.
Proof. First, observe that a generalized permutohedron P ⊆ RN is a summand of a generalized permutohedron
Q ⊆ RN iff there exists another generalized permutohedron R ⊆ RN such that λ · Q = P ⊕ R for some λ > 0. The
sufficiency of this condition is evident. For necessity write λ · Q = P ⊕ R, where λ > 0 and R ⊆ RN is a polytope. To
show that R is a generalized permutohedron Lemma 13 can be used. This lemma, applied to Q, says there exists γ > 0
and a polytope R′ ⊆ RN such that γ · Q0 = Q ⊕ R′, where Q0 is the usual permutohedron (see Example 5). Hence,
(λ · γ) · Q0 = (λ · Q) ⊕ (λ · R′) = P ⊕ R ⊕ (λ · R′) = R ⊕ (P ⊕ (λ · R′)) ,
which, again by Lemma 13, this time applied to R, says R is a generalized permutohedron.
By Corollary 11, the mapping m 7→ C(m) = W(m) = P considered on the cone of supermodular games is a
mapping from ♦(N) onto the set of generalized permutohedra. By Lemma 1, the mapping is one-to-one: the inverse
mapping is given by mP(S ) = minv∈P ∑i∈S vi for S ⊆ N; see also Theorem 24(xii).
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Since the mapping transforms sums to Minkowski sums and non-negative multiples to non-negative multiples,
any decomposition λ · Q = P ⊕ R, λ > 0, corresponds to a decomposition of the respective game λ · mQ = mP + mR.
Clearly, standardized games corresponds to standardized polytopes. If a standardized generalized permutohedron has
a non-trivial decomposition then it has a non-trivial decomposition into standardized polytopes.
A decomposition λ · mQ = mP + mR into standardized games also implies that mP,mR belong to the smallest face
F(mQ) of G⋄(N) containing mQ. Conversely, if mP ∈ F(mQ) then m′ ∈ F(mQ) exists with mQ = α · mP + (1 − α) · m′
for some α ∈ (0, 1). Since there exists a standardized generalized permutohedron R with α−1 · (1 − α) · m′ = mR, one
has α−1 · mQ = mP + mR and concludes that P  Q iff mP ∈ F(mQ). Therefore, P ≃ Q iff F(mP) = F(mQ).
In particular, a non-trivial decomposition of P in sense of Definition 7 correspond to a non-trivial decomposition
of λ·mP in the sense that none of its summands inG⋄(N) belongs to the relative interior of F(mP). Thus, a standardized
generalized permutohedron P ⊆ RN is indecomposable iff mP belongs to an extreme ray of G⋄(N). The generators of
these rays are characterized by Theorem 5; the zero function also trivially satisfies the condition from § 3.1 because
X has just the zero vector in that case. The remaining statements of Theorem 14 then follow from the fact that G⋄(N)
is a pointed rational polyhedral cone. 
Remark 15. A non-empty polytope P ⊆ RN is called indecomposable if every Minkowski summand of P has the
form α · P ⊕ {v}, where α ≥ 0 and v ∈ RN . This notion, treated in the theory of convex polytopes [20, 13], aims at
capturing the concept of extremality in an abstract way. Specifically, the set of non-empty polytopes in RN , being
equipped with the Minkowski addition ⊕ and the scalar multiplication by non-negative reals, can be viewed as an
abstract convex cone. The polytope is then indecomposable when it is an atom in the “face lattice” of this abstract
convex cone.
Given a generalized permutohedron P ⊆ RN , if there is a non-trivial decomposition of P in the sense of Defini-
tion 7, then P has a polytopal decomposition in the sense P = P1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ Pk, k ≥ 2, where at least one of Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k
is not in the form α ·P⊕{v}with α ≥ 0 and v ∈ RN ; note this is a corrected version of the definition of a decomposable
polytope from [13, p. 318]. Indeed, such a polytope Pi = α · P ⊕ {v} is either equivalent to P (if α > 0) or a singleton.
But the Minkowski sum of singletons is a singleton, which has no non-trivial decomposition. In particular, every
generalized permutohedron that is an indecomposable polytope is indecomposable in the sense of Definition 7.
Nevertheless, the converse is true as well. To observe that assume for a contradiction that P is a generalized
permutohedron indecomposable in the sense of Definition 7 but not an indecomposable polytope. Then, by [20,
Theorem 4], a finite collection Q1, . . . , Qk, k ≥ 2 of indecomposable polytopes exists such that P = Q1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ Qk;
without loss of generality assume that both P and Q1, . . . , Qk are standardized. Each Qi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k is a Minkowski
summand of P, and, therefore, using Lemma 13 applied to P, a summand of the classic permutohedron. Thus, every
Qi is a generalized permutohedron, again by Lemma 13. Since P itself is assumed to be indecomposable in the sense
of Definition 7 the fact P = Q1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ Qk implies there exists Qi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k equivalent to P. By the second claim of
Theorem 14 applied to Qi, P must be a positive multiple of Qi. As Qi is an indecomposable polytope, the same holds
for P, which is the contradiction.
Remark 15 means our Theorem 14 can be interpreted as follows: given a generalized permutohedron P ⊆ RN , we
provide a necessary and sufficient condition on P being an indecomposable polytope. The criterion we give to decide
that question is based on solving a particular system of homogenous linear equations.
Remark 16. Meyer in his 1974 paper [20] gave a criterion to recognize whether a given polytope P is indecomposable,
which is also based on solving a system of homogenous linear equations. The reader can ask whether our condition
from § 3.1 is the special case of Meyer’s criterion. The answer is that the two criteria differ significantly in terms of
methodology and motivation.
Specifically, the condition (2) of Theorem 3 in [20] characterizes indecomposability of a polytope P ⊆ RN in terms
of a linear equation system, denoted e[P] there. To apply that result one needs to have a complete list of facets of P
at disposal; note that, in our context of generalized permutohedra, the facets correspond to (some of the) subsets of N.
If P is full-dimensional, that is, if dim(P) = |N| = n, then each equation in e[P] corresponds to a certain set of n + 1
facets of P which intersect in a vertex of P; see [20, p. 79–80] where the equation system is specified. The condition
(2) in [20, Theorem 3] can equivalently be stated that the dimension of the space of solutions to e[P] is n + 1. Meyer
also considers an extended equation system. His idea is to add further n standardization equations corresponding to
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the translation of P so that its Steiner point, which is a kind of barycenter, is the zero vector. Then his criterion turns
into the condition that the dimension of the space of solutions to the extended linear equation system is just 1; this is
basically the condition (1) in [20, Theorem 3]. In this aspect, our condition from § 3.1 is analogous.
However, in Meyer’s equation system, the indeterminates correspond to facets of P, that is, in the context of
generalized permutohedra, to subsets of N. Thus, it is clear from this observation and the fact that the indeterminates
of our system are the pairs (vertex,variable) (see § 3.3) that our system and Meyer’s system are methodologically
different. Moreover, our criterion does not require computing the facets of P, although this is not a big problem in the
case of a generalized permutohedron.
Another note is that, in the case of generalized permutohedra, the linear equations in the system e[P] used by
Meyer [20] seem to have similar form as the linear (in)equalities provided by Kuiper et al. [17] discussed in Remark
6.
6. Relation to a former result by Rosenmu¨ller and Weidner
The paper by Rosenmu¨ller and Weidner [30] offers another criterion to recognize extreme supermodular functions.
The reader may be interested in what features our new result is different from their old one, if there is a substantial
difference at all.
The answer is that our criterion characterizing extreme supermodular functions is indeed different from their
criterion, although analogous in certain aspects. The main difference is that our characterization comes from a min-
representation of a supermodular function by means of additive functions, while the characterization by Rosenmu¨ller
and Weidner is based on a max-representation of a standardized supermodular game by means of modular functions.
Below we give some subtle arguments in favour of the opinion that the min-representation of a supermodular function
is more natural than its max-representation. Therefore, our characterization may appear to be more convenient.
6.1. Recalling the criterion by Rosenmu¨ller and Weidner
The main obstacle to compare transparently both criteria was that the paper [30] had been written in technically
awkward style. What follows is a kind of re-interpretation of their result. We provide simpler presentation of their
result (than the original one) and this allows us to explain clearly in what aspects our result is different and in what
aspects the results are analogous.
The paper [30] deals with non-negative supermodular games. A simple consideration, made in Remark 4, allows
one to observe their paper also gives a criterion to recognize the extreme rays of the cone G⋄(N). Any such a game
can be written as the maximum of finitely many modular functions l on P(N) of a special form, namely
l(S ) =
∑
i∈S
zi
 − z∅ for S ⊆ N, where z∅ ≥ 0 and zi ≥ 0 for i ∈ N
are non-negative coefficients. The max-representation of m ∈ G⋄(N) has the form
m(S ) = max
τ∈Ω
lτ(S ) := max
τ∈Ω
−zτ∅ +∑
i∈S
zτi
 for S ⊆ N, (25)
where Ω is a finite index set identifying the modular functions. For each τ ∈ Ω, the modular function lτ is specified by
a vector in Rn+1 of its non-negative coefficients zτ
∅
and zτi , i ∈ N. The indexing of modular functions in (25) plays only
an auxiliary role, since each modular function can be identified with the vector of its coefficients, viewed as a row-
vector inR{∅}∪N . Thus, the max-representation of m ∈ G⋄(N) can alternatively be described by a realΩ×({∅}∪N)-array
of the respective (non-negative) coefficients.
Rosenmu¨ller and Weidner [30] give further technical conditions on the representation (25), which allows them
to introduce a unique canonical representation for each m ∈ G⋄(N), up to re-indexing. Specifically, each modular
function lτ, τ ∈ Ω is ascribed its “carrier” Cτ and the class of sets Qτ at which the max-representation (25) is tight:
Cτ := { i ∈ N : zτi > 0 }, Qτ := { S ⊆ N : lτ(S ) = m(S ) } for every τ ∈ Ω.
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Every S ⊆ N is assigned a “tuft” of its subsets differing from it in at most one element:
tuft (S ) := {T ⊆ S : |S \ T | ≤ 1 } = {S } ∪
⋃
i∈S
{ S \ {i} } .
The technical conditions are as follows:
(i) ∀ τ ∈ Ω tuft (Cτ) ⊆ Qτ,
(ii) ∀ S ⊆ N ∃ τ ∈ Ω tuft (S ) ⊆ Qτ,
(iii) ∀ τ, π ∈ Ω Qπ ⊆ Qτ ⇒ π = τ.
Note that (i)-(iii) is our formally weakened re-formulation of the conditions (1)-(3) from Theorem 2.5 in [30] which,
however, leads to the same concept of a canonical max-representation. The existence of a max-representation of
m ∈ G⋄(N) satisfying (i)-(iii) can be shown as follows. One puts Ω = P(N) and ascribes a modular function lT to
every T ∈ Ω by defining directly its coefficients:
zTi := m(T ) − m(T \ {i}) for i ∈ N, (26)
zT∅ := −m(T ) +
∑
i∈T
zTi = (|T | − 1) · m(T ) −
∑
i∈T
m(T \ {i}) .
Then (25) holds and (i)-(ii) are fulfilled. Finally, Ω is reduced so that repeated occurrences of functions are removed
and, to ensure (iii), the elements T ∈ Ω with non-maximal tightness set classes QT (with respect to inclusion) are
dropped. We refer to [30] for the arguments why every max-representation of m satisfying (i)-(iii) has the above form.
A necessary and sufficient condition on m to be extreme, called non-degeneracy by Rosenmu¨ller and Weidner [30],
is that a certain system of linear equations on the elements of the above mentioned Ω × ({∅} ∪ N)-array (given by the
canonical max-representation) has a unique solution up to a real multiple. Specifically, one can put
Qτ0 := Q
τ ∩ { S ⊆ N : m(S ) = 0 } = { S ⊆ N : 0 = lτ(S ) = m(S ) } for τ ∈ Ω
and consider the following system of linear constraints on a real array y ∈ RΩ×({∅}∪N):
(x) ∀ τ ∈ Ω if i ∈ N \Cτ then y(τ, i) = 0,
(y) ∀ S ⊆ N ∀ τ, π ∈ Ω such that S ∈ Qτ ∩ Qπ
−y(τ, ∅) +∑i∈S y(τ, i) = −y(π, ∅) +∑i∈S y(π, i),
(z) ∀ τ ∈ Ω ∀ S ∈ Qτ0 − y(τ, ∅) +
∑
i∈S y(τ, i) = 0.
Again, (x)-(z) is simplified, but equivalent, formulation of the conditions (3.1)-(3.3) from [30]. The starting array
y(τ, j) = zτj for τ ∈ Ω and j ∈ {∅} ∪N given by (26) is a solution to (x)-(z). The main result of [30] is that m is extreme
iff the system of linear constraints (x)-(z) has a unique solution up to a multiple constant.
Observe that the condition of non-degeneracy is analogous to our condition from § 3.1: in both cases the require-
ment is that a solution to a system of linear constraints on the element of the respective real array is unique up to a
multiple. Even the conditions are analogous: (a) corresponds to (x), (b) to (y) and (z) is a further condition forced
by the presence of an additional component in the max-representation. On the other hand, the rows in the arrays do
not correspond to each other: in case of our condition from § 3.1 they correspond to additive upper bounds for m,
while in case of the non-degeneracy condition they describe modular lower bounds for m. The relation is illustrated
by a simple example.
Example 6. Assume N = {a, b, c} and consider the game m over N given by
m = 2 · δN + δ{a,b} + δ{a,c} + δ{b,c}.
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∅ {a} {b} {c} {a, b} {a, c} {b, c} N
µ X X X X
ν X X X • • • •
Table 1: The tightness sets in the max-representation from Example 6.
In Example 1, we have verified that m generates an extreme ray of G⋄(N) using our criterion from § 3.1, based on the
min-representation of m. As concerns the max-representation, the above described procedure based on (26) results in
five different modular functions, given by the following vectors [z∅ | za, zb, zc] of coefficients:
[0 | 0, 0, 0], [1 | 1, 1, 0], [1 | 1, 0, 1], [1 | 0, 1, 1], [1 | 1, 1, 1] .
The middle three of them can be dropped because they do not give maximal tightness set classes. The canonical
max-representation can be arranged into an Ω × ({∅} ∪ N)-array with Ω = {µ, ν}:
[ ∅ a b c
µ 0 0 0 0
ν 1 1 1 1
]
.
Table 1 indicates by bullets and by checkmarks what are the corresponding tightness sets inQτ\Qτ0 and inQ
τ
0, for τ ∈ Ω,
respectively. Now, solving (x)-(z) first gives y(µ, a) = y(µ, b) = y(µ, c) = 0 by (x) and then y(µ, ∅) = 0 by (z). Then
{a} ∈ Qν ∩ Qµ gives by (y) y(ν, a) − y(ν, ∅) = y(µ, a) − y(µ, ∅) = 0 and, analogously, y(ν, ∅) = y(ν, a) = y(ν, b) = y(ν, c).
Thus, m is extreme by the non-degeneracy criterion of Rosenmu¨ller and Weidner. Note that (x)-(z) has a unique
solution up to a constant even if we do not drop the modular functions with non-maximal tightness set classes from
the “starting” max-representation with five rows. 
6.2. The min-representation versus the max-representation
The class of supermodular games is neither closed under minimization nor closed under maximization. Indeed, in
the case N = {a, b, c} one has
δN + δ{a,b} + δ{a,c} = max
{
δN + δ{a,b} , δN + δ{a,c}
}
,
while in the case N = {a, b, c, d} one has
3 · δN + 2 · δ{a,b,c} + 2 · δ{a,b,d}
= min
{
4 · δN + 2 · δ{a,b,c} + 2 · δ{a,b,d} , 3 · δN + 2 · δ{a,b,c} + 2 · δ{a,b,d} + δ{a,b}
}
.
Therefore, none of these two representation modes has plain advantage.
Nevertheless, there are fine arguments in favor of the min-representation. They apply once one decides to interpret
a set function as a function defined on the vertices of the hypercube and to consider its extensions. Indeed, one can
embed P(N) into [0, 1]N using the mapping S 7→ χS for S ⊆ N; see (1). The core-based min-representation of
m ∈ G⋄(N) is related to the concept of the Lova´sz extension as defined in [18]. Indeed, (10) has the form
m(S ) = min
τ∈Υ
∑
j∈N
xτj · χS ( j) where S ⊆ N and xτ := [xm(τ, i)]i∈N for τ ∈ Υ.
This naturally leads to the extension ł of m on the hypercube:
ł(y) := min
τ∈Υ
∑
j∈N
xτj · y j for y ∈ [0, 1]N . (27)
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Since pointwise minimum of affine functions is concave, ł is a concave function on [0, 1]N. It follows from the basic
facts about the Lova´sz extension m̂ (see Appendix A) that verifying ł = m̂ over [0, 1]N boils down to show that, for
any enumeration π ∈ Υ, ł is a linear function on the simplex7
∇π := conv {χS : S ∈ Cπ} ⊆ [0, 1]N .
Indeed, the relations (27) and then (9), (10) imply, for any S ∈ Cπ,
ł(χS )
(27)
≤
∑
j∈N
xπj · χS ( j) =
∑
i∈S
xπi
(9)
= m(S ) (10)= min
τ∈Υ
∑
i∈S
xτi = min
τ∈Υ
∑
j∈N
xτj · χS ( j)
(27)
= ł(χS ).
Hence, the first inequality must be the equality, which allows one to conclude that ł coincides with the linear function
y ∈ ∇π 7→
∑
j∈N xπj · y j.
On the other hand, the form of canonical max-representation (25) of m ∈ G⋄(N) leads to introducing another
extension ~ of m, namely
~(y) := max
τ∈Ω
(−zτ∅ +
∑
j∈N
zτj · y j) for y ∈ [0, 1]N , where zτ := [zτi ]i∈{∅}∪N . (28)
This extension, inspired by the max-representation by Rosenmu¨ller and Weidner [30], is the pointwise maximum of
affine functions, and, therefore, a convex function on [0, 1]N. The specialty of this extension ~ is that, for any S ⊆ N,
it is affine on the simplex
∇S := conv {χT : T ∈ tuft (S ) } ⊆ [0, 1]N .
Indeed, this conclusion can be derived (by an analogous consideration as in the case of ł) from the condition (ii) in the
definition of the canonical max-representation and (25).
Let us compare both extensions. First, ł and ~ coincide on the edges of the hypercube [0, 1]N , which are the
segments connecting χS and χS \{i} for i ∈ S ⊆ N. One can also show that ł(y) ≥ ~(y) for any y ∈ [0, 1]N . The concave
extension ł is affine on every ∇π, π ∈ Υ and these are full-dimensional simplices covering [0, 1]N . On the other hand,
the convex extension ~ is ensured to be affine on other simplices ∇S , S ⊆ N, which are lower-dimensional in general.
These do not cover [0, 1]N and ∇N is the only one of them that is full-dimensional. To illustrate the difference note
that, for distinct a, b ∈ N and Z ⊆ N \ {a, b}, the values in y = 12 · χ{a}∪Z +
1
2 · χ{b}∪Z =
1
2 · χ{a,b}∪Z +
1
2 · χZ are
ł(y) = 12 · m({a, b} ∪ Z) + 12 · m(Z) and ~(y) = 12 · m({a} ∪ Z) + 12 · m({b} ∪ Z).
The subtle argument why ł is more natural extension than ~ is as follows. The maximal domains in [0, 1]N on
which ł is affine are the simplices ∇π, π ∈ Υ. In particular, the vertices of these maximal linearity domains for ł are the
vertices of the hypercube. This is the case no matter what is the extended game m ∈ G⋄(N). However, the maximal
domains in [0, 1]N on which ~ is affine may vary, they could have vertices with fractional coordinates. On the top of
that, the vertices of the maximal affine domains for ~ do depend on the extended game m.
Example 7. Assume N = {a, b, c} and consider a parameterized class of games over N
mλ = (3 + λ) · δN + (1 + λ) · δ{a,b} + δ{a,c} + δ{b,c}, where λ ≥ 0.
Then, no matter what λ is, the canonical max-representation ~ of mλ consists of five modular functions, namely lT
given by (26) for T ∈ T = { ∅, {a, b}, {a, c}, {b, c}, N }.
Thus, [0, 1]N splits into five tightness domains, namely {y ∈ [0, 1]N : lT (y) = ~(y)} for T ∈ T . These polytopes
are determined by twelve points in the hypercube given by Table 2 in which the bullets indicate to which tightness
domains they belong. For example, the tightness domain for T = {a, b} has six vertices, besides three vertices of the
two-dimensional simplex ∇{a,b} it has three other vertices, namely
[1/2, 1/2, 1/2], [1, 1/(3 + 2 · λ), (1 + λ)/(3 + 2 · λ)], [1/(3 + 2 · λ), 1, (1 + λ)/(3 + 2 · λ)] .
Observe that the domains are different for different parameters λ ≥ 0, that is, for different represented games mλ. 
7In this section, by a simplex we understand the convex hull of an affinely independent set of vectors.
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[ xa, xb, xc ] ∅ {a, b} {a, c} {b, c} N
[ 1, 1, 1 ] •
[ 1, 1, 0 ] • •
[ 1, 0, 1 ] • •
[ 0, 1, 1 ] • •
[ 1, 0, 0 ] • • •
[ 0, 1, 0 ] • • •
[ 0, 0, 1 ] • • •
[ 0, 0, 0 ] •
[ 12 , 12 , 12 ] • • • • •
[ 1, 13+2·λ , 1+λ3+2·λ ] • • •
[ 13+2·λ , 1, 1+λ3+2·λ ] • • •
[ 1+λ3+2·λ 1+λ3+2·λ 1 ] • • •
Table 2: Vertices of tightness domains in the max-representation from Example 7.
Remark 17. The motivation for the max-representation of supermodular games given in [30, p. 245] is a little bit
strange. Rosenmu¨ller and Weidner seem to misuse the terminology, specifically, the facts that supermodular games
are named “convex” in game theory and that the functional form of a modular set function is analogous to that of
an affine point function, for which reason they re-name modular functions to “affine”. They seem to segue from the
fact the any convex function (of a real variable) is the maximum of affine functions (of a real variable) to the idea
of represent any supermodular set function as the maximum of a collection of modular set functions. However, the
reasons why a supermodular game is named “convex” are completely different. The main reason is recalled in Remark
25. Another minor reason is that an important special case of a supermodular game is the so-called convex measure
game treated in § 7.1, defined as the composition of a real convex function with a non-negative additive set function.
Another supportive argument in favor of the min-representation is that the canonical max-representation intro-
duced by Rosenmu¨ller and Weidner [30] does not have such an elegant geometric interpretation as the core-based
min-representation has. Indeed, the vertices of the core C(m) for m ∈ G⋄(N) coincide with the vertices of its extended
version
E(m) :=
 [vi]i∈N : ∀ S ⊆ N
∑
i∈S
vi ≥ m(S )
 ,
which naturally corresponds to the min-representation of m by means of additive functions. Note that one can show
that C(m) is the Pareto minimum of E(m); compare with Theorem 2.3 from [11]. However, the vertices of the
following polyhedron
R(m) :=
z ∈ R{∅}∪N : z∅ ≥ 0, zi ≥ 0, i ∈ N & − z∅ +
∑
i∈S
zi ≤ m(S ), S ⊆ N
 ,
which naturally corresponds to the max-representation of m by means of modular functions of the considered type,
need not have the form of the canonical max-representation.
Example 8. Assume N = {a, b, c, d} and consider the game m† from Example 4. Then the above polyhedron R(m†)
has 13 vertices but only 11 of them correspond to sets T ⊆ N in the sense (26). The remaining two vertices
[z∅ | za, zb, zc, zd] of R(m†) are [2 | 2, 1, 1, 1] and [2 | 1, 2, 1, 1]. The tightness set class for the modular function given by
[z∅ | za, zb, zc, zd] = [2 | 2, 1, 1, 1] is the class
Q = { {a}, {a, b}, {a, c}, {a, d}, {c, d}, {a, b, c}, {a, b, d}, {a, c, d} },
which strictly contains the tightness set class for the function l{a,c,d} from the canonical max-representation of m†.
Thus, R(m†) leads to a tighter max-representation than the canonical max-representation. 
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The facts mentioned above lead us to the opinion that, for a supermodular game m, the concave extension proposed
by Lova´sz [18] is more natural than the convex extension (28) inspired by Rosenmu¨ller and Weidner [30], although
they both may appear to be convenient. For this reason we prefer the min-representation to the max-representation.
7. Remarks on other extremality criteria
In the 1970’s two other papers were published which provide very simple criteria to recognize extreme supermod-
ular functions in two special cases. These criteria basically consist in testing whether a collection of linear constraints
on a vector in RN has a unique solution.
The 1973 paper by Rosenmu¨ller and Weidner [29], which had probably been the source of inspiration for their
later 1974 general criterion [30], provides such a criterion for convex measure games, that is, for games expressible
as compositions of a convex function with a non-negative additive set function.
The 1978 paper by Nguyen [22] deals with non-decreasing submodular games and gives an analogous criterion
for extremality of such games in case they correspond to a matroid [23]; of course, his criterion can be “converted”
to the supermodular case. Moreover, Nguyen also presented in [22] a kind of extension to the case of a general non-
decreasing submodular game based on (his) concept of a matroidal expansion. Nevertheless, that extension of his
does not seem to lead to a practical criterion to test extremality of such general games.
The aim of this section is to recall those special criteria and illustrate, by means of examples, that they differ from
each other and from our new criterion as well.
7.1. The case of convex measure games
The paper [29] deals with non-negative supermodular games m satisfying m(N) = 1. The motivational task is
when a convex measure game m is an extreme point of this polytope. Some starting intuitive consideration leads the
authors to the restriction to a particular form of convex measure games. Specifically, provided one omits the trivial
case of modular m, the game is assumed to be a composition m = f α ◦ µ where µ : P(N) → [0, 1] is an additive set
function with µ(N) = 1 and f α : [0, 1] → [0, 1] a convex function of the form
f α(t) = 1
1 − α
· max {t − α, 0} for t ∈ [0, 1], determined by a parameter 0 < α < 1.
Rosenmu¨ller and Weidner [29] show that such a representation of m in terms of µ and α is unique under an additional
requirement µ({i}) ≤ 1 − α for i ∈ N.
The necessary and sufficient condition for a convex measure game m to be extreme in terms of such a “canonical”
representation is as follows. One introduces the class of sets
T := {T ⊆ N : µ(T ) = α}
and the result is that m is extreme iff the system of linear constraints
∀ T ∈ T
∑
i∈T
xi = 0 (29)
on real numbers xi, i ∈ N has a unique solution, namely x¯i = 0 for any i ∈ N.
Note that the non-degeneracy condition from [30] mentioned in § 6.1 can be interpreted as an indirect generaliza-
tion of this simple condition. Indeed, the above representation of a (standardized) convex measure game m = f α ◦ µ
means it has a max-representation consisting of two modular functions only, namely lN and l∅ ≡ 0 given by (26).
The class T is then nothing but the tightness set class QN0 ≡ Q
N ∩ Q∅. For this reason, despite that the canonical
max-representation of m mentioned in § 6.1 may involve additional functions, the constraints (x)-(z) from § 6.1 have
a unique solution up to a multiple iff (29) has solely the zero solution. We leave the verification of this statement as a
simple exercise to the reader. The above statements are illustrated by the following example.
Example 9. Assume N = {a, b, c, d} and consider the game m over N given by
m = δN +
1
2
· δ{a,b,c} +
1
2
· δ{a,b,d} +
1
2
· δ{a,c,d} .
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
T ⊆ N ∅ a b c d
{a, b, c, d} 32 1
1
2
1
2
1
2
{a, b, c} 1 12
1
2
1
2 0
{a, b, d} 1 12
1
2 0
1
2
{a, c, d} 1 12 0
1
2
1
2
∅ 0 0 0 0 0

QT
ab, ac, ad, abc, abd, acd, bcd, abcd
ab, ac, bc, abc, bcd
ab, ad, bd, abd, bcd
ac, ad, cd, acd, bcd
∅, a, b, c, d, ab, ac, ad, bc, bd, cd, bcd
Table 3: The max-representation and tightness set classes in Example 9.
It is a convex measure game represented by µ(a) = 2/5, µ(b) = µ(c) = µ(d) = 1/5 and α = 3/5. In particular, the class
T consists of four sets, namely {a, b}, {a, c}, {a, d} and {b, c, d}. Clearly, the only solution to (29), that is, of
xa + xb = xa + xc = xa + xd = xb + xc + xd = 0
is the zero vector in this case. On the other hand, the canonical max-representation given by (26) consists of five
modular functions. Their coefficients and tightness set classes are given in Table 3. Since QN ∪ Q∅ = P(N), m has a
max-representation consisting solely of lN and l∅ ≡ 0. Moreover, QN0 = Q
N ∩ Q∅ = T . Hence, the equations (z) from
§ 6.1 for yi := y(N, i), i ∈ {∅} ∪ N lead to ∑i∈S yi = y∅ for any S ∈ T , which then reduces to ∑i∈S yi = ∑ j∈T y j for any
S , T ∈ T . We also know that this reduced system has a positive solution, for example, yi = µ(i) for i ∈ N. A simple
consideration leads to a conclusion that the reduced system has a unique solution up to a multiple iff the only solution
of (29) is x¯i = 0 for i ∈ N.
Note that there are seven vertices of the core of m, namely [xa, xb, xc, xd] of the form
[1, 0, 0, 0], [1/2, 1/2, 0, 0], [1/2, 0, 1/2, 0], [1/2, 0, 0, 1/2], [0, 1/2, 1/2, 0], [0, 1/2, 0, 1/2], [0, 0, 1/2, 1/2] .
Thus, the system of linear equations (a)-(b) from § 3.1 involves many more variables than the special system (29).
One can certainly expect this to happen because the criterion from [29] was particularly tailored for the case of convex
measure games. 
On the other hand, if one does try to apply the criterion based on (29) to some given game over N, say to the
normalized version of the game t⋆ from Example 2, then one spends quite a lot of time to compute the respective
“canonical” representation. In the case of t⋆/22 one finally gets α = 1/2, µ(a) = 5/22, µ(b) = 4/11, and µ(c) = 9/22,
which results in the empty class T . Thus, the application of the criterion based on (29) itself is trivial, but a tedious
task may be to get the required “canonical” representation.
7.2. The case of matroids
The paper [22] deals with the cone of non-decreasing submodular games. A special case of such a game is the
rank function of a matroid, which is an integer-valued non-decreasing submodular game r satisfying r(S ) ≤ |S | for
any S ⊆ N. Note that an apparently weaker but equivalent formulation of the latter condition is r({i}) ≤ 1 for any
i ∈ N.
Theorem 2.1.5 of [22] gives a necessary and sufficient condition for a rank function r of a matroid to generate an
extreme ray of the above cone. To formulate that result in a suitable way we need the next concept.
Definition 8. The support of a game r ∈ RN is the least set M ⊆ N such that
∀ S ⊆ N r(S ) = r(S ∩ M) .
The appropriate formulation of the condition from [22] is that the corresponding matroid restricted to the support
of r is connected, which is a well-known concept in matroid theory; see [23, chapter 4]. Nevertheless, the condition
has an alternative formulation in terms of linear constraints on a vector inRM, where M is the support of r. Specifically,
the rank function r defines the class of matroidal bases (compare [23, § 1.3]):
B := { B ⊆ N : B maximal such that r(B) = |B| } ≡ { B ⊆ N : r(B) = |B| = r(N) }.
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It makes no problem to show that the support M of r coincides with the union of bases. Provided M ≡ ⋃B , ∅, the
condition is that the system of linear constraints
∀ B,C ∈ B
∑
i∈B
yi =
∑
j∈C
y j (30)
on real numbers yi, i ∈ M has a unique solution up to a multiple. Since all the bases of a matroid have the same
cardinality r(N), (30) always has a constant solution y¯i = u ∈ R, i ∈ M, and the condition can equivalently be stated
that the linear equation system
∑
i∈B xi = 0 for B ∈ B has solely the zero solution x¯i = 0 for i ∈ M.
Remark 18. Theorem 2.1.5 in [22] was formulated in a slightly misleading way. In fact, it says that “r is extreme in
the respective cone iff the matroid is connected”. This is not true as stated. Here is a simple counter-example: consider
N = {a, b, c} and put
r = δ{a,b,c} + δ{a,b} + δ{a,c} + δ{b,c} + δ{a} + δ{b},
which is the rank function of a matroid over N with bases {a} and {b}. The corresponding matroid is not connected
despite that r does generate an extreme ray of the cone. The reason why the matroid is not connected is that {a, b} and
{c} are non-trivial separators; see [23, § 4.2] for related concepts.
The point is that an additional technical assumption r({i}) = 1 for any i ∈ N is tacitly used despite it is omitted
in the formulation of [22, Theorem 2.1.5]. The assumption means that the corresponding matroid has no loops, see
[23, p. 13] for the related concept. It is indeed applied in the proof, specifically on page 378 of [22], the implication
(iii)⇒(i). This tacit assumption is stated in [22] earlier in the text as a convention, which is, unfortunately, hidden more
than one page before the very formulation of Theorem 2.1.5. However, in our paper, we have chosen to re-formulate
Nguyen’s result in such a way that the above-mentioned technical assumption is avoided.
To put that result into our context realize that a submodular game r over N is non-decreasing iff r(N) ≥ r(N \ {i})
for i ∈ N. Thus, one can always write r as the sum of a (non-negative) modular game and a submodular game r¯
satisfying
r¯(N) = r¯(N \ {i}) for any i ∈ N. (31)
Of course, the modular game is the linear combination of m↑i, i ∈ N with non-negative coefficients r(N) − r(N \ {i}),
i ∈ N. In fact, such a decomposition of r is uniquely determined: to this end introduce the notation
¯R(N) for the linear space of games r¯ over N satisfying (31),
¯R◦(N) for the cone of submodular games r¯ over N satisfying (31),
and realize that the only modular game in ¯R(N) is the zero function. In particular, the above result from [22] essentially
gives a criterion to recognize whether a rank function r¯ of a matroid satisfying (31) generates an extreme ray of ¯R◦(N).
One can transform ¯R(N) by an invertible linear mapping onto G(N) which transforms ¯R◦(N) onto G⋄(N). In fact,
there are two such suitable transformations, which are complementary to each other; we discuss this complementarity
topic later in Remark 19. Since an invertible linear mapping transforms extreme rays to extreme rays, this gives us
implicitly a criterion to recognize some of the extreme rays in G⋄(N).
From the point view of conditional independence interpretation of these games (see Appendix B, Remark 31) the
correspondence m ∈ G(N) ←→ r¯ ∈ ¯R(N) given by
m(S ) = −r¯(S ) +∑i∈S r¯({i}) for S ⊆ N,
r¯(T ) = −m(T ) + |T | · m(N) −∑i∈T m(N \ {i}) for T ⊆ N, (32)
seems to be natural because it has the property
∀ A, B ⊆ N m(A ∪ B) + m(A ∩ B) − m(A) − m(B) = −r¯(A ∪ B) − r¯(A ∩ B) + r¯(A) + r¯(B) ,
for which reason the conditional independence structures given by m and r¯ coincide. Note that (32) is, in fact, the
multiplication by (−1) adapted to fit into the spaces G(N) and ¯R(N). Other authors prefer the correspondence m ∈
G(N) ←→ r¯∗ ∈ ¯R(N) given by a simpler formula
m(S ) = r¯∗(N) − r¯∗(N \ S ) for S ⊆ N,
r¯∗(T ) = m(N) − m(N \ T ) for T ⊆ N, (33)
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see the concept of a dual submodular system from [11, p. 37]. However, this correspondence does not preserve the
conditional independence interpretation.
Clearly, the rank function r¯ of a matroid satisfying (31) is transformed by (32) to an integer-valued standardized
supermodular game m satisfying
m(N) − m(N \ {i}) ≡ r¯({i}) ≤ 1 for any i ∈ N.
The mapping (33) also transforms rank functions r¯∗ satisfying (31) to the same class of games. This is the class of
games m ∈ G⋄(N) to which the matroidal criterion is applicable. An alternative characterization of this class of games
is that all vertices of the core C(m) are zero-one vectors; see Corollary 26 in Appendix A. Note that the case of convex
measure games is not covered by the matroid case because the integer-valued version m˜ of the game from Example 9
satisfies m˜(N) − m˜({b, c, d}) = 2.
Given m ∈ G⋄(N) with zero-one ext (C(m)), one can apply the formula (32) to get the respective rank function r¯
and determine B on basis of it. Alternatively, the transformation (33) can be used instead. We illustrate the procedure
in the next example, which also shows that the case of matroids is not covered by the convex measure game case.
Example 10. Put N = {a, b, c, d} and consider an integer-valued supermodular game
m = 2 · δN + δ{a,b,c} + δ{a,b,d} + δ{a,c,d} + δ{b,c,d} + δ{a,b}.
One has m(N) − m(N \ {i}) = 1 for any i ∈ N and the corresponding rank function is
r¯ = 2 · δN + 2 ·
∑
i∈N
δN\{i} + 2 ·
∑
S⊆N, |S |=2,
S,{a,b}
δS + δ{a,b} +
∑
i∈N
δ{i},
which means one has
B = { S ⊆ N : |S | = 2, S , {a, b} } = { {a, c}, {a, d}, {b, c}, {b, d}, {c, d} } .
Clearly, every solution to (30) is constant in this case, which implies that m is an extreme supermodular game by
Nguyen’s criterion. Alternatively, the mapping (33) gives
r¯∗ = 2 · δN + 2 ·
∑
i∈N
δN\{i} + 2 ·
∑
S⊆N, |S |=2,
S,{c,d}
δS + δ{c,d} +
∑
i∈N
δ{i},
which defines another class of bases, namely
B∗ = { {a, b}, {a, c}, {a, d}, {b, c}, {b, d} } .
On the other hand, m is not a convex measure game. Indeed, assume for a contradiction m = f ◦ µ, where µ is a
probability measure and f : [0, 1] → [0, 2] convex with f (0) = 0 and f (1) = 2. Then, since f cannot be constant on
any sub-interval of f−1(0, 2], one has
m(A) = f (µ(A)) = f (µ(B)) = m(B) > 0 ⇒ µ(A) = µ(B) for any A, B ⊆ N.
Thus, {a, b} ⊆ {a, b, c} and m({a, b}) = m({a, b, c}) > 0 implies µ({c}) = 0, which gives µ({a, b, d}) = µ(N) ⇒ 1 =
m({a, b, d}) = m(N) = 2, a contradiction.
The canonical max-representation of m from § 6.1 consists of three modular functions, shown in Table 4, while
there are five vertices of core C(m), namely the vectors [xa, xb, xc, xd] of the form
[1, 1, 0, 0], [1, 0, 1, 0], [1, 0, 0, 1], [0, 1, 1, 0], [0, 1, 0, 1] ,
which are the incidence vectors of sets in B∗. Thus, both the system of linear equation (x)-(z) from § 6.1 and the
system (a)-(b) from § 3.1 involve more variables than Nguyen’s matroid-based criterion. 
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
T ⊆ N ∅ a b c d
{a, b, c, d} 2 1 1 1 1
{a, b} 1 1 1 0 0
∅ 0 0 0 0 0

QT
ac, ad, bc, bd, cd, abc, abd, acd, bcd, abcd
a, b, ab, ac, ad, bc, bd, abc, abd
∅, a, b, c, d, ac, ad, bc, bd, cd
Table 4: The max-representation and tightness set classes in Example 10.
Remark 19. This is to explain the relation of linear mappings given by (32) and (33). Given m ∈ G(N), the corre-
sponding games r¯ and r¯∗ are in the following relation
r¯∗(T ) = r¯(N \ T ) − r¯(N) +
∑
i∈T
r¯({i}) for T ⊆ N, (34)
which defines an invertible linear mapping of ¯R(N) onto itself. Since the inverse of (34) on ¯R(N) is itself, it can
be viewed as a kind of duality transformation on ¯R(N). Moreover, it maps ¯R◦(N) onto itself and rank functions of
matroids within ¯R(N) to rank functions. Since r¯∗({i}) = r¯({i}) for i ∈ N the supports of rank functions r¯ and r¯∗ coincide.
The relation of matroids corresponding to r¯ and r¯∗ is that their restrictions to the (shared) support M ⊆ N are dual
matroids; see [23, chapter 2] for this concept. That means, if M , ∅, the class B∗ of bases given by r¯∗ is
B∗ = {M \ B : B ∈ B }, where B is the class of bases given by r¯.
Since the condition (30) for B can be re-written as
∀ B,C ∈ B
∑
i∈B\C
yi =
∑
j∈C\B
y j ,
it clearly gives the same requirement as (30) for B∗. In particular, no matter whether one decides to apply Nguyen’s
criterion either to r¯ or to r¯∗ one gets the same condition.
Analogously, given r¯ ∈ ¯R(N) the corresponding games m and m∗ in G(N) determined by (32) and (33) are related
by a duality relation on G(N) given by
m∗(S ) = m(N \ S ) + (|S | − 1) · m(N) −
∑
i∈S
m(N \ {i}) for S ⊆ N.
Of course, the mappings m 7→ m∗ transforms G⋄(N) onto itself. These are the reasons why we consider (32) and (33)
to be complementary to each other.
There is even closer relation of matroidal bases and the (vertices of the) respective core, which allows us to
re-formulate Nguyen’s matroidal criterion as follows.
Corollary 20. Let m ∈ G⋄(N) be such that X = ext (C(m)) consists of zero-one vectors and the support of m, denoted
by M, is non-empty. Then m generates an extreme ray of G⋄(N) iff every solution to the system of linear constraints
on y ∈ RM
∀ v,w ∈ X = ext (C(m)) 0 =
∑
i∈M
(vi − wi) · yi (35)
is constant, that is, y¯i = u for some u ∈ R.
Proof. By Corollary 26, m is integer-valued and m(N) −m(N \ {i}) ≤ 1 for any i ∈ N. Re-write the definition of C(m)
in terms of the respective rank function r¯∗ given by (33):
C(m) = { [vi]i∈N ∈ RN :
∑
i∈N
vi = r¯
∗(N) & ∀ T ⊆ N
∑
i∈T
vi ≤ r¯
∗(T ) }
and apply Proposition 3.12(iii) in [41] to deduce that the vertices of C(m) are just the incidence vectors of the bases
of the matroid given by r¯∗. Note that the same observation was made in [1, Proposition 2.5] and [8, Proposition 2.2.5].
Thus, (30) turns into (35). 
29
Remark 21. The above condition (35) cannot be extended to an extremality criterion for general m ∈ G⋄(N). Put, for
example, N = {a, b, c, d} and m = 2 ·δN +δ{a,b,c}+δ{b,c,d}. Then the core C(m) has seven vertices, namely [xa, xb, xc, xd]
of the form
[1, 1, 0, 0], [1, 0, 1, 0], [1, 0, 0, 1], [0, 1, 0, 1], [0, 0, 1, 1], [0, 2, 0, 0], [0, 0, 2, 0].
Apparently the condition (35) is fulfilled in this case despite m is not extreme since m = (δN + δ{a,b,c}) + (δN + δ{b,c,d}).
In fact, (35) geometrically means that C(m) has the maximal attainable dimension |M| − 1, where M is the support of
m. Indeed, (35) means y ∈ RM belongs to the orthogonal complement of a translated affine hull of C(m).
Remark 22. The central concept in [22] is that of an expansion of an integer-valued non-decreasing submodular
game r over N, which can be introduced as a rank function r′ of a matroid over N′ such that there exists a function
κ : N′ → N onto N satisfying r(S ) = r′(κ−1(S )) for any S ⊆ N. Note that this is our simplified re-formulation of the
definition and construction from [22, § 1.3].
Nguyen [22] shows that such a game r has an expansion r′ with |N′| = ∑i∈N r({i}) and restricts his attention to
such expansions. Theorem 2.1.9 in [22] then gives an implicit “criterion” to recognize whether an integer-valued non-
decreasing submodular game r is not extreme, that is, whether it does not generate an extreme ray of the respective
cone. The condition is that, for some positive integer k ∈ N, the multiple k · r has an expansion r′ such that the matroid
corresponding to r′ is not connected.
Despite testing of matroid connectivity is easy, the condition is not suitable as the criterion for testing extremality
of r. Although |N′| is fixed, there is no upper bound on the multiplicative factor k ∈ N, and one can hardly test an infi-
nite number of potential rank functions r′ on N′ to confirm whether r is extreme or not using this “expansion criterion”.
To be more specific note that it follows from the proof of [22, Theorem 2.1.9] that the above multiplicative factor k
is a common integer multiple of denominators of rational coefficients in a potential non-trivial conic combination of
non-decreasing submodular functions giving r.
7.3. Other results and summary
The 2000 paper by Kashiwabara [16] has been inspired by Ngyuen [22] and the cone of non-decreasing submod-
ular games. A sufficient condition for extremality of an integer-valued game is offered in [16], which is more general
than the matroidal criterion.
Nevertheless, to tackle the extremality problem, (non-decreasing) submodular games are transformed in [16]
by (33) to (non-decreasing) supermodular games and then the Mo¨bius inversion (see Appendix A) is applied. The
sufficient conditions for extremality (of such an integer-valued game) are formulated in terms of the values of the
Mo¨bius inversion. These technical conditions from [16, § 7] lead to the verification of certain combinatorial properties.
Remark 23. The equivalent condition for extremality in [16, Theorem 3.4] seems to be analogous to the extremality
characterization in terms of conditional independence; see Appendix B, Corollary 30. In our terms, Theorem 3.4 from
[16] says, for a non-negative supermodular game m, that m is extreme iff the only (non-negative standardized) game
producing the same or larger conditional independence model is a multiple of m.
Let us summarize the observations from § 7. Examples 9 and 10 show that the specific criteria discussed in § 7.1
and § 7.2 differ from each other despite being completely analogous. They also differ from our new criterion in § 3.1
because the systems of linear constraints are different. Nevertheless, the matroidal criterion can also be stated in
term of the core as done in Corollary 20. The specific criteria offered by Kashiwabara [16] are predominantly of
combinatorial nature; they are not formulated in terms of the core.
8. Conclusions
The central topic of this paper was how to recognize whether m ∈ G⋄(N) generates an extreme ray of G⋄(N). The
reader familiar with polyhedral geometry may come up with the following suggestion. Assuming one has at disposal
the facet description of the cone, which is our case, why not to try the following procedure. Consider a system of
linear constraints describing the smallest face F(m) of the cone containing m and check whether every solution to that
linear system has the form of a non-negative multiple of m or not. These constrains could be as follows: every facet
containing m corresponds to an equality constraint while every other facet gives an inequality constraint.
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The problem with this approach is that one has too many facets of G⋄(N), namely
(
n
2
)
· 2n−2, where n = |N| (see
Appendix B). Thus, the complexity of such an extremality test is exponential in n = |N|. On the other hand, provided
one confirms our guess that g ∈ G⋄(N) is a limit game for m (see Remark 6) iff g ∈ F(m), one can perhaps utilize the
main result from [17] to simplify the linear description of F(m).
We would like to find out what is the complexity of testing extremality by means of our Theorem 5. We hope
there is a chance that our linear system (a)-(b) results in a more efficient extremality test than the above mentioned
approach.
The following open question is directly motivated by Example 3: is the condition from Theorem 5 necessary for
an exact standardized game to be extreme in the respective cone? Thus, one of our next research topics could be the
cone of standardized exact games. We would like to explicate its facet description and deal with criteria to recognize
extreme exact games. One can also study the core polytopes for extreme exact games and raise the question whether
they are always indecomposable.
We consider the concept of core structure from § 3.3 to be of crucial significance. One of our possible future
research directions could be to search for combinatorial criteria to test extremality of a supermodular game in terms
of this concept. However, even if such a result is achieved, it would be just a preliminary step paving the way towards
a more ambitious plan: to achieve a complete characterization of extreme supermodular functions. By the complete
characterization we mean here an enumeration procedure such that, for any given n = |N|, the procedure generates
every extreme ray of G⋄(N).
Appendix A. Supermodularity
In this appendix, we collect various characterizations of supermodular games appearing in the literature. The
reader should be familiar with the notation and concepts from § 2.
Let µm denote the Mo¨bius inversion of a game m over N, that is,
µm(A) :=
∑
B⊆A
(−1)|A\B| · m(B) for every A ⊆ N.
The embedding of P(N) into RN by means of the (incidence vector) mapping S 7→ χS , for S ⊆ N, allows one to
interpret any game m over N as a real function on {0, 1}N . Indeed, it suffices to put m̂(χS ) := m(S ) for any S ⊆ N.
Below we describe a natural way of extending m̂ to all nonnegative vectors inRN ; we are going to denote this extension
by m̂ as well because there is no danger of confusion in this paper.
The idea is that, for any y ∈ [0,∞)N , there is a unique chain8 Cy of subsets of N such that N ∈ Cy, ∅ < Cy and there
are unique coefficients λN ≥ 0 and λS > 0 for S ∈ Cy \ {N} such that
y =
∑
S∈Cy
λS · χS . (A.1)
The Lova´sz extension m̂ : [0,∞)N → R (of m) is then defined linearly with respect to the decomposition (A.1), that is,
m̂(y) :=
∑
S∈Cy
λS · m̂(χS ) ≡
∑
S∈Cy
λS · m(S ) for every y ∈ [0,∞)N .
Some researchers also call m̂(y) the (discrete) Choquet integral of y with respect to m [12]. Note that, for any maximal
chain Cπ, π ∈ Υ as introduced in (8), m̂ is linear on the cone spanned by the vectors χS , S ∈ Cπ. Indeed, realize that
the vectors χS , S ∈ Cπ \{∅} are linearly independent and y in the cone has a unique decomposition y =
∑
S∈Cπ\{∅} λS ·χS
(with λS ≥ 0). Dropping some zero coefficients then leads to (A.1).
This implies that the following properties are true.
• The function m̂ is continuous and piecewise linear on [0,∞)N .
8Here, by a chain is meant a class of sets C ⊆ P(N) such that ∀ A, B ∈ C either A ⊆ B or B ⊆ A.
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• m̂(λ · y) = λ · m̂(y) for every λ ≥ 0 and y ∈ [0,∞)N .
• m̂1 + m2 = m̂1 + m̂2 for every pair of games m1,m2 over N.
• û · m = u · m̂ for every game m over N and every u ∈ R.
For a real number u ∈ R, we abbreviate u+ := max {u, 0} and u− := max {−u, 0}. The upper core of m (see [6, § 4]) is
the polytope
C+(m) :=
⊕
S⊆N
µm(S )>0
µm(S )+ · ∆S ,
where
⊕
denotes the multiple Minkowski sum. Analogously, the lower core of m is
C−(m) :=
⊕
S⊆N
µm(S )<0
µm(S )− · ∆S .
Theorem 24. Given a game m over N, the following conditions are equivalent.
(i) m is supermodular.
(ii) For every A ⊆ B ⊆ N and every C ⊆ N \ B, one has
m(A ∪ C) − m(A) ≤ m(B ∪ C) − m(B).
(iii) For every A ⊆ B ⊆ N and every i ∈ N \ B, one has
m(A ∪ {i}) − m(A) ≤ m(B ∪ {i}) − m(B).
(iv) For every i, j ∈ N with i , j and every A ⊆ N \ {i, j}, one has
m(A ∪ {i}) − m(A) ≤ m(A ∪ {i, j}) − m(A ∪ { j}).
(v) The Mo¨bius inversion µm satisfies
∀ i, j ∈ N, i , j ∀A ⊆ N \ {i, j}
∑
B⊆A
µm(B ∪ {i, j}) ≥ 0.
(vi) The Mo¨bius inversion µm satisfies for every A, B ⊆ N∑
D∈D
µm(D) ≥ 0 where D = {D ⊆ (A ∪ B) : D \ B , ∅ & D \ A , ∅ }.
(vii) For each π ∈ Υ, one has xm(π, ∗) ∈ C(m); in other words, all marginal vectors of m belong to the core of m.
(viii) C(m) , ∅ and, for every S , T ⊆ N,
FS (m) ∩ FT (m) ⊆ FS∪T (m) ∩ FS∩T (m),
where FS (m) := { v ∈ C(m) : ∑i∈S vi = m(S ) } is the face of C(m) for S ⊆ N.
(ix) C(m) , ∅ and, for every v ∈ C(m), the class of tightness sets
Smv := { S ⊆ N :
∑
i∈S
vi = m(S ) }
is closed under the operations of intersection and union.9
(x) C(m) = W(m).
9Another formulation of (ix) is that Smv is a lattice relative to ∩ and ∪, for any v ∈ C(m).
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(xi) For every S ⊆ N, one has m(S ) = min
τ∈Υ
∑
i∈S x
m(τ, i) .
(xii) For every S ⊆ N, one has m(S ) = min
v∈W(m)
∑
i∈S vi .
(xiii) The Lova´sz extension m̂ of m is a concave real function on [0,∞)N .
(xiv) For every y ∈ [0,∞)N one has m̂(y) = min
v∈W(m)
∑
j∈N v( j) · y( j).
(xv) C+(m) = C(m) ⊕C−(m).
Observe that the crucial Lemma 1 now follows from Theorem 24, which says (i) ⇔ (xi) and, moreover, (i) ⇒ (x).
Proof. The equivalence (i) ⇔ (ii) ⇔ (iii) ⇔ (vii) was shown in 1981 note by Ichiishi [14]; for (vii) ⇔ (iv) see [17,
Corollary 8]; (i) ⇔ (v) was shown in [17, Theorem 9]; (i) ⇔ (vi) appeared in [4, Corollary 2]. Hence, (i) ⇔ . . . ⇔
(vii).
Theorem 5 in 1972 paper by Shapley [33] implies (i) ⇒ (viii). Clearly, (ix) is an equivalent formulation of (viii).
Theorem 3 in [33] says that (viii) implies that the extreme points of C(m) are precisely the marginal vectors of m; in
particular, (ix) ⇔ (viii) ⇒ (x). The implication (x) ⇒ (vii) is evident. Hence, (i) ⇔ . . .⇔ (x).
To show (vii) ⇒ (xi) consider fixed S ⊆ N and the fact xm(τ, ∗) ∈ C(m) for any τ ∈ Υ gives ∑i∈S xm(τ, i) ≥ m(S )
implying minτ∈Υ
∑
i∈S x
m(τ, i) ≥ m(S ). Conversely, there exists π ∈ Υwith S ∈ Cπ and, by (9), m(S ) = ∑i∈S xm(π, i) ≥
minτ∈Υ
∑
i∈S x
m(τ, i). In order to show (xi) ⇒ (vii), consider fixed π ∈ Υ and the marginal vector xm(π, ∗). Write for
S ⊆ N, ∑
i∈S
xm(π, i) ≥ min
τ∈Υ
∑
i∈S
xm(τ, i) = m(S ) .
For S = N one has
∑
i∈N x
m(π, i) = m(N) directly from (7). Thus, xm(π, ∗) ∈ C(m). By the definition of W(m), (xi) ⇔
(xii). Hence, (i) ⇔ . . .⇔ (xii).
The equivalence (i) ⇔ (xiii) is the “supermodular version” of the theorem originally proved by Lova´sz for sub-
modular functions [18, § 4]; see also [11, Theorem 6.13]. The equivalences (i)⇔ (xiv) ⇔ (xv) were shown by Danilov
and Koshevoy [6, § 5]. Hence, we can conclude that (i) ⇔ . . .⇔ (xv). 
Remark 25. In cooperative game theory, (i) ⇔ (iii) is interpreted that a function m is supermodular iff the marginal
contribution of a player to a coalition is monotone non-decreasing with respect to set-theoretical inclusion. This
explains the term “convex” used to name supermodular functions in game theory in the analogy with one of equivalent
characterizations of convexity of a real function. Observe that this established terminology contrasts with the concavity
of the Lova´sz extension; see also our discussion in § 6.2, in particular, Remark 17.
The following observation also follows from Theorem 24.
Corollary 26. Assuming m ∈ G⋄(N), all the vertices of the core C(m) are zero-one vectors iff m is integer-valued and
m(N) − m(N \ {i}) ≤ 1 for any i ∈ N.
Proof. For necessity use Theorem 24, conditions (xii) and (x), to derive that, for any S ⊆ N, m(S ) = minv∈X ∑i∈S vi,
where X = ext (C(m)). Since X ⊆ {0, 1}N , m is integer-valued. For any i ∈ N, it also implies that v ∈ X with
m(N \ {i}) = ∑ j∈N\{i} v j exists. Thus, m(N) − m(N \ {i}) = ∑ j∈N v j −∑ j∈N\{i} v j = vi ≤ 1.
For sufficiency use Theorem 24, condition (x), and the definition of W(m), to observe that every vertex of C(m) is a
row in (7), and, therefore, has integers as components. For every v ∈ C(m) and i ∈ N, by (4), vi = ∑ j∈N v j−∑ j∈N\{i} v j ≤
m(N) − m(N \ {i}) ≤ 1 and vi ≥ m({i}) = 0 implying C(m) ⊆ [0, 1]N. Altogether, ext (C(m)) ⊆ {0, 1}N . 
Appendix B. Conditional independence (CI) interpretation
Given a supermodular set function m over N and pairwise disjoint subsets X, Y, Z ⊆ N, we say that X is condition-
ally independent of Y given Z with respect to m and write
X ⊥ Y | Z [m] iff m(X ∪ Y ∪ Z) + m(Z) − m(X ∪ Z) − m(Y ∪ Z) = 0 . (B.1)
33
The statement X ⊥ Y | Z [m] is then called the conditional independence (CI) statement. The CI model produced
by m then consists of valid CI statements with respect to m. The collection of structural independence models over
N, introduced in [34, § 5.4.2], can equivalently be defined as the class of CI models produced by supermodular set
functions over N. This collection is a finite lattice whose order is given by the set-theoretic inclusion between classes
of represented CI statements.
Remark 27. The concept of a structural independence model generalizes the concept of a probabilistic CI structure;
see [34, § 5.1.1] for detailed explanation. In the context of probabilistic CI, the elements of N correspond to random
variables, usually finite-valued ones. The probabilistic CI statement X ⊥ Y | Z then means that the (set of random)
variables in X is stochastically independent of the variables in Y conditionally on (the values of) the variables in Z.
This interpretation was our motivation to call the elements of N variables in this paper.
Let E(N) denote the class of all triplets 〈a, b|Z〉, where a, b ∈ N are distinct and Z ⊆ N \ {a, b}. For each such
triplet and function m ∈ RP(N), put
∆m(a, b|Z) := m({a, b} ∪ Z) + m(Z) − m({a} ∪ Z) − m({b} ∪ Z).
By Theorem 24(iv), the expression ∆m(a, b|Z) is always non-negative for a supermodular function m. In fact, one even
has m(X ∪ Y ∪ Z) + m(Z) − m(X ∪ Z) − m(Y ∪ Z) ≥ 0 for any triplet X, Y, Z of pairwise disjoint subsets of N. Hence,
any structural independence model is a semi-graphoid, which is a concept proposed by Pearl [24]: for any pairwise
disjoint X, Y, Z,W ⊆ N, one has ∅ ⊥ Y | Z and
X ⊥ Y | Z ⇔ Y ⊥ X | Z ,
X ⊥ Y ∪ W | Z ⇔ { X ⊥ Y | Z ∪W & X ⊥ W | Z } .
This implies that every structural model is determined by its elementary CI statements, which are statements of the
form {a} ⊥ {b} | Z where a, b ∈ N, a , b and Z ⊆ N \ {a, b}. By Theorem 24(iv), the class of supermodular games
♦(N) is a (rational) polyhedral cone in RP(N) characterized by
(
n
2
)
· 2n−2 inequalities as follows:
m ∈ ♦(N) ⇔ [∀ 〈a, b|Z〉 ∈ E(N) ∆m(a, b|Z) ≥ 0 ] for m ∈ RP(N) with m(∅) = 0.
A well-known fact is that the inequalities above are exactly the facet-defining inequalities for♦(N) and its standardized
version G⋄(N); see, for example, [17, Corollary 11] or one can derive that from [15, Lemma 2.1].
We will say that functions m1,m2 ∈ ♦(N) are qualitatively equivalent (see [34, § 5.1.1]) and write m1 ∼ m2 if
they produce the same CI model. It follows from the semi-graphoid properties mentioned above that m1 ∼ m2 iff
I(m1) = I(m2), where
I(m) := { 〈a, b|Z〉 ∈ E(N) : ∆m(a, b|Z) = 0 }.
Let’s denote by F (N) the lattice of non-empty faces of ♦(N) ordered by inclusion ⊆, which is, of course, isomorphic
to the lattice of non-empty faces of G⋄(N). For any m ∈ ♦(N), F(m) will denote the smallest face containing m:
F(m) :=
⋂
{F : F ∈ F (N) & m ∈ F} .
The following lemma implies that the face lattice F (N) of ♦(N) is anti-isomorphic to the lattice of structural models.
Lemma 28. ∀m1,m2 ∈ ♦(N) F(m1) ⊆ F(m2) ⇔ I(m1) ⊇ I(m2) .
Proof. Let F∗(N) denote the class of facets of ♦(N). As every face is the intersection of facets containing it, one
has F(m) = ⋂F∈F∗(N), m∈F F for every m ∈ ♦(N). Here, the whole cone ♦(N) is conventionally the intersection of the
empty collection of facets. Hence, because m ∈ F(m) for any m ∈ ♦(N), F(m1) ⊆ F(m2) iff
∀ F ∈ F∗(N) m2 ∈ F ⇒ m1 ∈ F . (B.2)
However, the facets of ♦(N) correspond to triplets in E(N), more specifically, they have the form F = {m ∈
♦(N) : ∆m(a, b|Z) = 0 } for 〈a, b|Z〉 ∈ E(N). Thus, (B.2) is equivalent to ∀ 〈a, b|Z〉 ∈ E(N), ∆m2(a, b|Z) =
0 ⇒ ∆m1(a, b|Z) = 0, which is nothing but I(m1) ⊇ I(m2). 
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Corollary 29. ∀m1,m2 ∈ ♦(N) m1 ∼ m2 ⇔ I(m1) = I(m2) ⇔ F(m1) = F(m2).
Hence, the equivalence classes of ∼ are relative interiors of faces of ♦(N). In other words,
∀m1,m2 ∈ ♦(N) m1 ∼ m2 ⇔
[
∃ F ∈ F (N) m1,m2 ∈ relint (F)
]
.
Proof. For F ∈ F (N), relint (F) is the set of all m ∈ ♦(N) such that F(m) = F. 
Another consequence of Lemma 28 is the following observation, which has already been mentioned as Lemma
5.6 in [34].
Corollary 30. A game m generates an extreme ray of G⋄(N) iff the CI model produced by m is a co-atom in the
lattice of structural independence models, which means that the only structural model strictly containing it is the
complete independence model.10
Remark 31. The class of structural independence models can alternatively be introduced in terms of submodular set
functions. This corresponds to the description of a probabilistic CI structure by means of the entropy function; see
Remark 4.4 in [34]. Specifically, given a submodular game r over N, { 〈a, b|Z〉 ∈ E(N) : ∆r(a, b|Z) = 0 } is the
respective structural independence model. Since ∆r(a, b|Z) ≤ 0 for any such r and 〈a, b|Z〉 ∈ E(N) everything works
like in the supermodular case. In particular, the correspondence r ↔ m := −r is the correspondence which preserves
CI interpretation.
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